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I have never doubted the truth of signs Adso; they are the
only things man has with which to orient himself in the world.
What I did not understand was the relation among the signs."
I. INTRODUCTION
Law and policy do not mix well. The legal system is a signifi-
cant force which contributes to the splintering of substantive poli-
cies. While this argument is made with specific reference to energy
law and policy, it also has a general application to other classes of
complex cases. The claims made to demonstrate these assertions
are only slightly more immodest than that made by Eco's philo-
sophical hero-sleuth, William of Baskerville.
The "signs" that law and policy do not interact neatly mani-
fest themselves in the form of conflicts of two different categories.
In the first category are conflicts between the ends and purposes of
law and policy. These are addressed in Section 11 of this article. In
the second category are conflicts within the system that is charged
with the responsibility of making decisions regarding law and pol-
icy. Conflicts appear in the structure of the system, in the method-
ologies the system employs, and in the substantive rules the sys-
tem produces. These conflicts, addressed in Sections I through V,
* Copyright, 1985 by Joseph P. Tomain. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati, College of Law. AB., University of Notre Dame, J.D. George Washington
University.
1. U. Eco, THE NAMz OF THE ROSE 492 (1983).
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have been institutionalized by law; they are embedded in the re-
cesses of the legal and policy decisionmaking apparatus.
As a matter of logical deduction, if there are conflicts between
the ends of law and policy and within the means of the decision-
making system itself, then the fact that a comprehensive policy has
failed to emerge is explicable. What all of this does not explain is
why the numerous conflicts do not burst the entire system apart
and result in chaos. Here is the immodest portion of the proposal:
there is a relation among the signs. Energy policy is not wholly
indeterminant. Even though the conflicts fragment comprehensive
policy proposals, policy does move along identifiable paths. Two
sets of interdependent values, one economic, the other political,
help us to orient ourselves in the policymaking world. The eco-
nomic and political values work together, in a centripetal fashion,
to help shape the general direction for law and policy decisionmak-
ing. Their interaction, a normative pas de deux, produces the rela-
tion among the signs.
II. LAW AND POLICY IN A COMPLEX WORLD
Energy issues are polycentric2 and thus are complex when con-
sidered alone. In addition, decisions relative to energy issues are
further complicated by and must be made within the context of a
public law decisionmaking system which is itself complex and con-
tains many uncertainties.3 As a result, either the issues themselves,
2. A "polycentric" decision as described by Lon Fuller:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spiderweb. A pull on one
strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as
a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of
the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of ten-
sions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or
more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a 'polycentric' situation because it is
'many centered'-each crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing
tensions.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 395 (1978).
3. On complexity see Fuller, id. at 394-404 (discussing the relative incapacity of adju-
dication to solve 'polycentric' problems); G. CALABREsi & P. BoBsrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-28
(1978) (elaboration of complex problems); M. WESSEL, SCINCE AND CONSCIENCE 4-10 (1980)
(discussing the same for socio-scientific disputes); Yellin, High Technology and the
Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 489, 494-
508 (1981) (same); On uncertainty see, R. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 8-9 (1981);
D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983); Farago, Intractable Cases: The
Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 195, 200-04, 208-39 (1980);
and, Trubek, Allocating the Burden of Environmental Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets
NEPA's Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 747.
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or the system that translates the issues into law may produce a
fragmented policy.
Energy issues typically cause great concern among numerous
interest groups, and divisions within those groups, which generate
ambiguous policy preferences. Environmentalists, for example,
may prefer an anti-nuclear policy and may work to prevent opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant. But environmentalists can hardly be
expected to support enthusiastically the pro-coal alternative if the
cancelled plant requires an expansion of the coal burning facilities
in order to produce the requisite amount of electricity converts to
coal. Even assuming the resolution of the positive issues, norma-
tive conflicts arise as well. Positive economic and scientific issues
arise which set forth competing claims of seemingly equal value.
Such are the characteristics of a polycentric decision.
Energy issues are imbued with multiple political, social, eco-
nomic, and hence, philosophic uncertainties. Decisions are increas-
ingly forward-looking and require compromises and accomodations
that may have long-term repercussions. Public law decisionmaking
no longer fits the dispute resolution model of common law adjudi-
cation. Rather than stare decisis, numerous competing values and
a vast body of statutory law are the chief forces that shape a "pub-
lic law' 4 decision. The rise of public law decisionmaking has en-
gendered serious rethinking5 of the role of law in society and the
place of policy in relation to law.
Within the last two decades agencies have been delegated and
have exercised increasing authority to administer public law. As a
result, they have either taken or have been delegated more poli-
cymaking responsibility.6 This rapid growth of the administrative
state has been met with considerable suspicion and criticism.7 The
4. See G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTiS 1-8 (1982). Professor
Calabresi calls this development "statutorification" and states that our legal system is
"choking on statutes." See also Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4-8 (1982); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281-1304 (1976); D. HOROWrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-21,
255-98 (1977); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1195 (1982).
5. The basic scholarly re-examination is Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975). Refer also to note 6 infra.
6. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DIRTY Am 42, 42-44 (1981); R.
LITWAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION Ch. 34-58; J. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE 106, 106-25 (1983);
7. In addition to Stewart, supra note 4, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION
ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (1979); M. Baram,
1985]
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desires for a comprehensive understanding of the policymaking
process or to forge consistent substantive policies has focused in-
creased attention on the policymaking functions of agencies."
The argument for the integration of law and policy is based on
the assumption that law and policy should function together
smoothly enough to allow comprehensive policies to emerge. This
focus is misplaced and the argument is unsound. Concentration on
the interaction of law and policy at the agency level will yield
neither an adequate understanding of the policymaking process
nor a full and coherent substantive policy. There are several rea-
sons for this failure. First, such a viewpoint is too narrow. The
polycentric and public law nature of these issues must be respected
and this requires a systemic overview of the legal and policymaking
systems rather than a particularistic look at agency actions., A
concentrated look at bureaucratic activities may well miss impor-
tant larger phenomena. Second, law and policy frequently function
separately. Often they operate in counterpoint, rather than in syn-
chronization. Law is often adopted to conform to or counteract ex-
isting policy. Therefore, a unified policy will not always result from
a policy following law. Both law and policy recognize the need for
substantive decisions as well as the need for decisionmaking
processes. Yet the recognition of these needs can occur at different
times with the consequence that the process employed does not
necessarily expedite the substantive directives. 10 Third, law and
policy clash because they are guided by different rationales. While
law tends to focus on specifically defined issues, a single policy
Alternatives to Regulation (1982); S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (1982); Breyer, An-
alyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARv. L. REv. 549 (1979); Proceedings of the National Conference on Federal Regulation:
Roads to Reform; 32 AD. L. REv. 123 (1980); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Adminis-
trative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1981); Strauss, Regulatory
Reform in a Time of Transition, 15 Suss. L. Rev. 9803 (1981); Verkuil, The Emerging Con-
cept of Administrative Procedure, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 258 (1978).
8. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L.
REv. 257, 338-54 (1979); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HAuv.
L. Rev. 393 (1981).
9. On looking at political interactions systemically rather than particularistically see
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063, 1098-1105 (1981). See generally D. HOF-
STADrER, GODEL, EscHER AND BACH 311-65 (1979).
10. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 103-04 (a well-designed process should recognize val-
ues of rationality, efficiency and procedural fairness; to the extent these cannot be recon-
ciled, policy suffers). See also Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L. J. 65, 66-71 (1983) (similar discussion).
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framework tends to implicate a multitude of issues of braoder so-
cial impact.
A closer look at the respective roles of law and policy in soci-
ety may help to illustrate the law-policy interaction.
A. Law
It can be said law is a simple and elegant device useful for
describing the social order. This is certainly true if the law is used
to analyze past events. If we limit our view of law in this fashion,
however, then the story which is about to unfold is incomplete.
The law, we at least like to think, is also forward looking; it has a
predictive function.11 Nothing is startling in any of this except in
today's world, particularly with the growth of public and statutory
law and more so with the increasing power of administrative agen-
cies, the predictive function is seriously.eroding.12
The simple and elegant device called law which aspires to
point the direction for the development of particular substantive
rules is not so clear in its pathfinding for the complex policy issues
which the legal system seeks to foster or control today. The predic-
tive function may have worked for the common law13 which was a
relatively limited legal system composed primarily of judges as-
signed the responsibility of divining the meaning of cases and a
manageable amount of statutory and constitutional law. Today's
legal culture with its welter of legislation and regulation, proposed
and interim regulations, and rules and orders has created a critical
mass of law and new institutions foreign to the common law.14 This
critical mass has weakened the predictive function of law by in-
serting more information than can be assimilated. The primary
11. See B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); L. FULLER, THE PRINCII'LES OF
SOCIAL ORDER (K. Winston ed. 1981); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963)
(descriptive function of law); I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER FOR THE LIMITS OF LAW 370-83
(1980); R. PosNE-, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179-91 (2d ed. 1977); Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897) (on law's predictive function).
12. G. CALABREsi supra note 3, at 163-66; Diver, supra note 8, at 406-08.
13. But see Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1717-23 (1982); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1685 (1976); Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code,
30 UCLA L. REV. 898, 900-21 (1983);
14. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURES OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs 66-91 (2d ed. 1970)
(discussing how a critical mass of data and information can transform institutions as well as
ideas).
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reason for this decline is the legal system15 assumes too much by
trying to integrate law and policy."l A forced link between law and
policy exacerbates the numerous conflicts inherent in the struc-
tures, methodologies, and substantive rules comprising the deci-
sionmaking system. The embedded conflicts in the legal system
cause the law to be less predictive; substantive policy is less coher-
ent, and, at times, seems indeterminate. 17 Nevertheless, identifi-
able sets of values and principles based on political and economic
norms do exist which confine the ambit within which decisions
must be made, and therefore, affect the character of the decisions.
If the primary reason for the erosion of the predictive function
is law's inability to decide complex substantive cases, the primary
response is to establish a process for law and policy decisionmak-
ing. Law makers are asked to decide a greater number of issues
which contain an increasing number of technological, scientific,
and economic uncertainties and complexities. In a world in which
there is a strong desire and felt need for decisions based on sub-
stantive rather than procedural principles there is, nevertheless, a
pull towards procedural decisionmaking.' s In the face of imponder-
15. The terms "legal system" and "law" are used in this article in their broadest
senses to mean the exercise of legal authority by all legal decisionmakers. Further, reference
herein to "law" or to the legal or decisionmaking "system" means the substantive rules,
legal structures, and methods through which decisions are made. This point will be dis-
cussed throughout the article.
16. DeLong, supra note 8 at 338-44.
17. On indeterminacy see KAIRYs, THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE,
(1982); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 837-38
(1983); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 388-89 (1981); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HA v. L. REV. 563,
567-76 (1983); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Criti-
cal Legal Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1679-80 (1982). The assertion that law is
indeterminate should not be taken to mean "anything goes." Although particular substan-
tive policies may not have a high degree of predictability, the principles that guide the poli-
cies are evident as is argued infra Part VI.
18. This procedural pull is part of the contemporary jurisprudential dialogue. For ex-
ample, in B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LBERAL STATE (1980), Professor Ackerman
sets out a mode of political and philosophical discourse based on a structured dialogue
about power. His attempt to move from the process of the dialogue to substantive principles
is less than fully satisfying because of the generality of the principles that result. See Dwor-
kin, What Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 47 (Jan. 20, 1983) (critical review of B. ACKER-
MAN, SoCiAL JUSTICE IN Tm LMERAL STATE (1980). This tendency towards proceduralism
forms the current debate about the concept of equality. See Burton, Comment on "Empty
Ideas". Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L. J. 1136 (1982);
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575
(1983); D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983); Westen,
On "Confusing Ideas:" A Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Westen, The Empty Idea of
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ables and irreconcilable differences of fact and opinion it is often
better to construct a decisionmaking process rather than impose
hard substantive decisions. The decisionmaker, however, can lose
sight of the substantive outcome while keeping vigilance on the
procedural aspects of decisionmaking. When processes become
more important than substance, substantive policy can become in-
coherent, incomplete, incongruent and internally inconsistent.
This Article illustrates the ways in which policy (or the need
for a policy) confronts the legal system and how the legal system
prevents the formation of a full substantive policy. Conflicts in
law, its processes and its institutions, heighten the incongruity be-
tween substance and process to the detriment of formulating a
comprehensive policy. This argument is not only a comment on ap-
plied or internal administrative law; it has a larger application. In
a society in which there are diverse claimants for legal rights, and
which claims present hard choices or conflict diametrically, proce-
dural fairness in decisionmaking is stressed over substantive prin-
ciples upon which decisions will be based.
The issues to be discussed fall within traditional legal catego-
ries and are consistent with existing legal rules. However, a study
of the traditional legal rules, structures and methodologies does
not yield a coherent and comprehensive national energy policy.
Rather, contemporary energy policy is diverse and splintered. Per-
haps this splintering is endemic to all complex issues such as en-
ergy, health, the environment, social services, and education. Per-
haps it further reflects the pluralistic nature of our polity, and
within this pluralism this phenomenon reflects the ambivalence
that society, as a whole, feels toward complex issues.19 Perhaps it is
in the nature of complex problems to preclude comprehensive re-
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science,
Math and Morals, 81 MICH. L REv. 604 (1983). This author favors the intermediate posi-
tion, that substance and process influence each other. See, e.g., Brest, The Substance of
Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981) (book review of J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisRust. A
THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW (1980)).
19. E.g., T. LAGASSA & T. DANEKE, The Defunct Energy Dichotomy, in ENERGY Pomcy
AND PUBLIc ADMINISTRATION 1 (1980):
Energy perhaps more than any other policy domain is a paradigm case of what
Theodore Lowi calls 'interest group liberalism,' or a situation in which competing
interest groups (although not equally competitive) and fragmented institutional
arrangements converge to disaggregate and diffuse the policy making process.
See also J. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITIcs OF ENERGY 4-8
(1983) (Chubb's book, while recognizing that the complexities of energy may make policy
seem indeterminate argues that there are three identifiable policymaking patterns).
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suits.20 The tension between substance and process may not be
bad. Indeed, this dynamic state may be well suited to the needs of
a fast paced, rapidly evolving scientific and technological field such
as energy. It may be good for the law to act as a brake on the
implementation of full scale substantive policies in the face of such
uncertainty. On the other hand, because energy industries com-
prise such large segments of an ailing economy, quick, forceful de-
cisions may be sorely needed.
We can descriptively illustrate the functions of the legal sys-
tem relative to policymaking in the context of larger political and
economic norms. Public law decisionmaking and law's predictive
function suffer because of the complexity of the issues and the tilt
toward proceduralism. Courts and agencies, as they are presently
structured, are not effective in dealing with complex scientific and
technological issues.21 The reasons precluding the formation of a
comprehensive energy policy are deeper than this, however. The
incompatibility between law and policy lies not only in structural
design; the incompatibility also resides in the methods used to de-
cide issues, the substantive rules themselves, and in sets of com-
peting values.
B. Policy
Policymaking has assumed an expansive and expanding role in
our society. Because most policymaking is done in administrative
agencies, they occupy a unique position.
Even though agencies have a certain degree of independence,2
20. The problems to be discussed may preclude comprehensive policymaking because
of their very scale, see J. FISHKIN, Tim LIMITs OF OBLIGATION 3-9, 46-59, 145-49 (1982); or by
virtue of social choice theory, see K ARROW, SOCL. CHOICE AND INDIvDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1963) and Arrow, Symposium: The Implications of Social Choice Theory for Legal Deci-
sionmaking, 9 HOPSTRA L. REv. 1373 (1981); or because of the "tragic" nature of the choices
themselves, see G. CAL.BPnsI & P. BoBBrrT, supra note 3 at 17-28; or because comprehensive
policymaking is an unwise myth, see Diver, supra note 8, at 428-34. The argument made in
this article is that the legal system itself precludes comprehensive policy formation.
21. M. WESSEL, supra note 3, at 141-83 (scientific consensus-finding); Stewart, supra
note 5, at 1760-90 (interest representation model of administrative law).Yellin, supra note 3,
at 555-60 (use of special masters to give appellate courts the opportunity to render "second
opinions" of agency action);
22. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard University Press
1977) ("Policy decisions must therefore be made through the operation of some political pro-
cess designed to produce an accurate expression of the different interests that should be
taken into account." Id. at 85; Hays, Political Choice in Regulatory Administration, in REG-
ULATION IN PERSPECTIVE (McGraw ed.1981) ("Regulation of the earnings should be viewed as
[Vol. 22:661
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policy is affected by political variables and reflects contemporary
political values. Policy then becomes: "The description and expla-
nation of the causes and consequences of government activity.
'23
Therefore, the study of energy policymaking is very much the
study of the politics of energy.2"
Policy analysis examines different variables and has different
objectives than does legal analysis. As a discipline it is relatively
new, growing out of a need to understand the failure of attempted
solutions to complex problems.25 The methods used by political
scientists focus on the operation of political institutions, the func-
tion of interest groups in society, and how policy embodies the
preferences of governing bodies. Policy analysis attempts to de-
scribe what goes into the political system, and what goes on inside
that system; it then evaluates the impact of the emergent policy.28
The basic lifecycle of policy is procedural. A policy goes through
the stages of goal-setting, planning, implementation, assessment
and evaluation, and termination. 7 Therefore, the study of policy is
an amorphous, open-ended, fundamentally procedural study of the
political process.
However, what eventually results from the policy-making pro-
cess is a substantive policy that has been splintered because of its
interaction with the legal system. Thus, the dichotomy between
substance and process, which created a tension within the legal
system, again reveals itself in the policymaking system.28
The rules and principles of law and the workings and impact
of the legal system on policy is left unexamined by most political
an opportunity to analyze political choice which in turn, can be combined with other evi-
dence about choice in many political realms to establish patterns of political structure and
change."Id. at 125).
23. T. DYE, POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (1976).
24. See J. CHUBB, supra note 19; B. COMMON., THE PoLuics OF ENERGY (1979); G.
DESOUZA, ENERGY POLICY AND FORECASTING (1981); ENERGY POLICY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION (G. Daneka & G. Lagassa eds. 1980); ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
A RATIONAL FUTURE (R. Axelrod ed. 1981); W. ROSENBAUM, ENERGY, POLITICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1981); R STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE (1979).
25. E. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 1 (1975).
26. The bifurcation between law and policy is useful in that a study of policy, how it is
made, and what its effects are, should aid in the evaluation of the legal system. If, as con-
tended here, the legal system prevents the formation of an effective energy policy, then
policy studies should assist in restructuring the legal system to facilitate energy
policymaking.
27. W. ROSENBAUM, supra note 24, at 7.
28. T. DYE, UNDERSTANDING POLICY ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1975); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND
MARKETS 119-31 (1977); R LINEBERRY, ARcAN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
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science-oriented policy analysts. This is not to discredit policy
analysis as a whole for its failure to incorporate legal analysis 29
They are different disciplines, and each may be somewhat circum-
scribed by its own boundaries. However, if they are considered to-
gether, legal analysis and policy analysis are complementary.30 Pol-
icy analysis alone cannot, nor does it aspire to, describe how the
tensions within the legal system affect policymaking processes and
substantive policy.
The ultimate system political scientists design for more effec-
tive policymaking must take into account the ability of the legal
system to leave its imprint on policy." The process of policy analy-
sis tends to describe what exists or suggests a hypothetical struc-
ture for better policymaking. It does not examine the glue holding
the structure together. The legal system is the glue of the policy
making structure. Without the legal system, no policy could be
implemented.
Theoretically, legal rules and principles derived from constitu-
tions, statutes, regulations, and cases are applied in a particular
fashion within the confines of specifically described legal struc-
tures. It is obvious to any lawyer that legal decisions are not as
certain and predictable as this description suggests. The significant
fact is that positive rules, methods, and distinct structures, how-
ever loose, exist which distinguish legal decisionmaking from
policymaking.
Policy analysis can be used to clarify the legal system and the
legal system can define the legitimizing contours of policy analysis;
thus the two interact.3 2 However, the interaction is not always
29. See T. DYE, supra note 28, at 17-38.
30. DeLong, supra note 8, at 319-21, 329-54.
31. D. MAZMANIAN & P. SABATIER, EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1981). The au-
thors state that the study of public policy implementation, defined as what takes place be-
tween the formal enactment of the rule of law and its impact, is the "missing link" in the
study of policymaking. This moves us closer to a study of the interaction of law and policy,
but not much closer. This article concentrates on those positive elements of the legal system
that prevent comprehensive policymaking with respect to complex issues.
32. The study of this interaction may be viewed as a grand form of policy analysis or
meta-policy analysis. This more generalized and abstract version of policy "analysis" is the
subject of study of economists such as G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968);
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMr. Sci. 3 (1971); lawyer-
economists such as R. POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); lawyer-philoso-
phers such as B. AcKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) and R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); and philosophers such as R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AN




This article focuses on the ways in which positive legal rules,
established legal institutions, and legally adopted methodologies
prevent the coalescence of a comprehensive national energy policy.
The development of a full, substantive energy policy is thwarted
by conflicting imperatives and values. These same values neverthe-
less give policy its purpose and prevent it from becoming com-
pletely incoherent.
The central conflict between the ends of law and policy, then,
is the tension between substance and process. Both systems need
processes and both must make substantive decisions, but not nec-
essarily at the same time or in the same order. Law sets up its
structures then decides substantive questions. Policy proposes sub-
stantive positions, then implements its decision, through process.
At times the systems can work in tandem, but even they confront
conflicts within the decisionmaking system.
III. STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS
Structural conflicts exist between decisionmaking bodies.
These conflicts prevent the fruition of a whole energy policy and
they evince a thematic tension between the centralization and the
decentralization of decisionmaking power.33 Conflicts abound in
this debate between federal agencies, within federal agencies, be-
tween branches of the federal government, between presidential
administrations, and most acutely between the exercise of deci-
sionmaking authority between federal and state governments. Al-
though interagency and interbranch competition is more acute at
the federal level it also exists at the state level. State-local-regional
and interstate34 conflicts of power occur as well.
Some of the conflicts are aptly characterized as political, par-
ticularly when one branch attempts to assert its will over another,
or when one presidential administration decides upon and imple-
ments an energy policy which is opposed by a subsequent adminis-
tration. Yet these so-called "political" conflicts are bounded and
institutionalized by law. The conflicts are bounded in the sense
33. G. CALABREsi & P. BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 53-57; and Diver, supra note 8, at 394-
401, 406-08 (in comparing incrementalist policymaking with comprehensive rationalist poli-
cymaking, Diver addresses the question of who should be responsible for policymaking).
34. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Illinois v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
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that the Constitution limits the authority of each branch. They are
institutionalized, for example, when one presidential administra-
tion is constrained to follow or forced to alter the laws enacted by
its predecessor. The legal institutionalization of these conflicts cuts
against effective policy formation and implementation.
A. Presidential Administration Conflicts
The policy views of the Carter and Reagan Administrations
are radically different. This is notably true relative to energy pol-
icy. It is also true that by the force of law President Reagan must
live to some degree with former President Carter's energy legacy.
President Carter's energy policy emerged in a series of presi-
dential addresses and in the passage of legislation based on those
addresses. In his "moral equivalent of war" speech 5 President
Carter presented the principles of his plan to combat the energy
crisis:
1) Energy decisionmaking should be centralized;
2) Economic growth must be encouraged;
3) Protection of the environment must continue;
4) Dependence on foreign energy sources should be reduced;
5) Energy Policy must be fair and equitable;
6) Conservation is the cornerstone;
7) Prices should reflect costs;
8) Government policies must be predictable and certain;
9) Scarce fuels should be conserved while coal consumption is
increased; and,
10) Unconventional sources of energy must be developed.
To some degree, each of these directives effects and is affected by
policy conflicts.
1. Energy Decisionmaking Should be Centralized. Carter
urged the need for comprehensive and coordinated government
regulation in the area of energy resource management. To this end,
Congress created the Department of Energy.36 Yet, while complex-
ity may make centralization attractive, it also produces tensions
undermining the consistency central decisionmaking seeks to
35. 1 J. CARTER, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRzsmErs 656-62 (1977); 13 WEEKLY Comn'. OF
PREs. Doc. 560-65 (1977).




2. Economic Growth. Energy industries account for approxi-
mately 30% of the G.N.P. of the United States.-8 This factor can-
not be ignored in a time of sagging national and world economies.
Carter's energy policy assumed a direct link between a healthy en-
ergy industry and economic prosperity. Although this link can be
questioned, it has generally not been doubted by the makers of
national policy. 9 This issue is particularly germane to the question
of the "reindustrialization" of the United States.40 Should the
United States "reindustrialize" by producing more energy sources
or can this be achieved in accordance with a conservation ethic?
3. Protection of the Environment. Hard questions exist as to
whether new energy policies can co-exist with current environmen-
tal standards or whether those standards must be lowered. Will the
production of more oil and gas, for example, or the transition to
greater use of coal cause too much environmental degradation?
Similarly, what are the environmental risks and costs associated
with the development of alternative sources such as oil shale and
tar sands or even certain renewable sources? If accommodations
between energy and environmental concerns can be made what are
the economic consequences of those accommodations?
4. Reduced Dependence on Foreign Sources. While consen-
sus can be reached on this point for national security reasons, this
is a policy plank which is not entirely free from difficulty. Domes-
tic production of oil is limited; the OPEC cartel greatly influenced,
if not determined, oil prices for a period; and, world money mar-
kets are petrodollar sensitive.41 The world economy cannot with-
stand a rapid withdrawal by the United States from foreign oil
markets.
5. Energy Policy Must be Fair and Equitable. Will the cho-
37. Refer to note 32 supra.
38. See, e.g., L. THuRow, THE ZERo-SuM SocETY 26-40 (1980); UNrED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY, INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF ENERGY AND THE ECONOMY (DOE/PE-0030, July,
1981).
39. Compare R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGrN, ENERGY FUTuRE 141-44 (1979)(asserting that
the link between the GNP and energy consumption is elastic rather than rigid) with A.
LoVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE (energy conservation actually pro-
motes economic prosperity) 7-11 (1977).
40. See, e.g., Reich, Beyond Free Trade, 61 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 773 (Spring 1983); Ro-
senthal, Drafting a Democratic Industrial Plan, N.Y. Times, August 28, 1983, § 6 (maga-
zine), at 31.
41. D. YERGIN, GLOBAL INSECURITY 33-57 (1982).
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sen energy policy be fair to individuals and groups? 42 Will the re-
sulting distribution of wealth and resources be equitable and effi-
cient? Fairness is often a term of such generality as to be
meaningless out of context. To say an energy policy must be fair
does not define fairness. More importantly fairness sometimes can,
and does, conflict with efficiency.
6. Conservation is the Cornerstone. What effect does conser-
vation have on the economy relative to productivity? How will con-
servation be accomplished? Is conservation a reduction in demand
or an increase in energy efficiency or both? The classic way to re-
duce demand is to raise prices. If prices rise, which income groups
will bear the burden of conservation? Should conservation be a
major part of our energy policy?4 3
7. Prices Should Reflect Costs. The country can no longer
rely on a cheap energy policy, nor is there any hope for one in the
foreseeable future. Costs will rise and the distributional questions
alluded to above will have to be confronted. Should consumers or
producers absorb cost increases? If consumers, then which
groups?44 Can people on fixed incomes absorb price increases or
must some classes of consumers subsidize others?
8. Government Policies Must Be Predictable and Certain.
Certainty and predictability in policy may sound like desirable
goals in theory. They are unrealistic in a society as complex as
ours. Because of the complexities and uncertainties involved in the
energy area it is often more important a decision be made than it
be made correctly. Fair process may often be a more realizable goal
than substantive equity or efficiency.
9. Conservation of Scarce Fuels and Increased Use of Coal.
This more specific point was an attempt by President Carter to
put a concrete policy together. If conservation can be limited to
certain resources while we expand production of other more abun-
dant resources, economic growth may occur alongside a conserva-
tionist policy. Yet, it is by no means certain a pro-coal policy can
be achieved without a serious revamping of existent government
regulations such as air and water quality laws and surface reclama-
tion regulations.45
42. L. THUROW, supra note 38.
43. R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, supra note 39, at 136-82.
44. See, e.g., Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Re-
form: Taxation Through Ratemaking, 28 HAST. L.J. 1085 (1977).
45. The byzantine nature of our pro-coal production policies and our pro-clean air
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10. Develop Unconventional Sources of Energy. We can de-
fine conventional energy as oil, gas, coal and nuclear power; all re-
maining resources are "unconventional." The unconventional
sources include both renewable and non-renewable resources. Re-
newable resources include solar, wind, and biomass, while the non-
renewable resources include oil shale, tar sands and geothermal
resources.
Congress passed the National Energy Act in October, 197846
which embodied these major features of the Carter plan. President
Carter's second major energy message, delivered on April 5, 197947
stressed the need for the increased domestic production of oil and
the decontrol of oil prices.48 This speech was the basis for the pas-
sage of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax.49 The President's final
energy address was delivered on July 15 and 16, 1979.10 Carter re-
turned to his "moral equivalent of war" rhetoric and he argued
American's energy policies posed a fundamental threat to Ameri-
can democracy. Congress again responded with major legislation,
known as the Energy Security Act,51 which deals with the estab-
policies may have worked to deter coal production and may have fouled the air. These
events demonstrate how competing policy objectives can work to create counterproductive
policies. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLEa, CLEAN CoALIDmrTY Am 13, 13-25 (1981) (the book
is an elaboration of the authors' article Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air
Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980)). See also Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New
Deal: Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412 (1981); Smith & Randle, Comment on Beyond the New
Deal, 90 YALE L.J. 1398 (1981);
46. The National Energy Act is a composite of the following acts: The National En-
ergy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206, amended by Pub. L. No.96-
294, 94 Stat. 716 (1978); The Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620,
92 Stat. 3289; The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117; Energy Security Act Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611, 770 (1980); The Natural
Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 3301-3432 and § 7255 (Supp. H 1978); The Energy Tax Act of
1978, Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174.
47. 1 J. CARTER, supra note 35, at 609-14; 15 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 609-15
(1979).
48. The decontrol was scheduled for October 1, 1981 and was accelerated to January
28, 1981 by President Reagan in Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124-25 (1982); reprinted
in 15 U.S.C.S. § 757.
49. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scattered sections of 17, 19, 26, 31 and
42 U.S.C. (1982)).
50. 2 J. CARTER, supra note 35, at 1235-47; 15 WEEKLY Co MP. oF PRES. Doc. 1235-47
(1979).
51. The Energy Security Act is comprised of the Defense Production Act Amendments
of 1980, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (Supp. IV.); United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-95 (Supp. IV.); Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 8803 (Supp. IV); Renewable Energy Resources Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § § 2701-08
and 42 U.S.C. § 7371-75 (Supp. IV); Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, 12
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lishment of the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation, the de-
velopment of synfuels, and with renewables such as biomass, alco-
hol, and solar energy, together with conservation and geothermal
energy.
President Carter's contribution to the formulation of an en-
ergy policy was formidable. His administration saw the creation of
a massive bureaucracy, the direct and pervasive federal govern-
ment involvement in the pricing,52 allocation5 3 and distribution
54 of
natural resources, and a federal financial 55 commitment to the de-
velopment of new resources.
The conflicts inherent in Carter's program are significant, and
tradeoffs and accomodations are necessary. Such phrases as "Big-
ger is Better," "Less is More," "No Nukes," "Synfuels," "High-
Technology," and "Soft Paths" embody basic and fundamental
conflicts, yet these slogans were part of our discourse on energy.
Economic growth impinges on equity and redistribution issues; in-
creased domestic production confronts severe environmental ques-
tions; the examples are many. To the extent policy goals are in
conflict the resultant policy will be splintered.
Another, more institutionalized conflict exists, however. Even
if President Carter's policy preferences were complete or coherent
or both, a fractionalized policy is inevitable given a change in pres-
idential administrations. It is not surprising, nor is it an institu-
tionalized conflict, as that term is used here, that the Reagan ad-
ministration approaches energy policy differently from its
predecessor. That type of conflict is the stuff of presidential polit-
ics. The characteristic institutionalized conflict results from the
massive amount of positive law implanted by a previous regime,
U.S.C. § §1451-1723 (Supp. IV); Geothermal Energy Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. § § 1501-42
(Supp. IV); the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § § 8901-12 (Supp. IV).
52. See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Titles I and II, 15 U.S.C. § § 3301-3432
and 42 U.S.C. § 7255 (Supp. II 1978); Energy Conservation and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §
757 (i)(1)(A) (1976); 10 C.F.R. § § 210-12, (1981); Union Oil Co. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 1688 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982). Although oil price controls preceded
President Carter, see, e.g., Pasco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration 525 F.2d 1391
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Sawhill, 525 F.2d 1068 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1975), his administration witnessed their continuance and enforcement, see,
e.g., DOE v. Louisiana, 690 F.2d 180 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982).
53. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. DOE, 482 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1979).
54. See, e.g., Arizona Elec. Power Coop v. FERC, 631 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Natu-
ral Gas Policy Act of 1978, Title IV, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. H 1978).
55. United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-95
(Supp. IV)-
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preventing President Reagan's energy (or economic) policies from
being quickly assimilated by the nation.
A fundamental political difference between Carter's and Rea-
gan's energy views, for example, concerns whether the public or
private sectors should have primary responsibility for formulating
policy. Carter called for government regulation and Reagan's phi-
losophy is based on private sector participation s.5  The debate con-
cerning the wisdom of government regulation versus the free mar-
ket is more than a political difference relative to energy policy,
because President Reagan's policy views must confront the positive
law put in place by the Carter administration. If the Department
of Energy burdens Reagan's economic plan then it must be system-
atically altered or eliminated. 57 The same applies to the U.S. Syn-
thetic Fuels Corporation. 8 It was created to promote development
56. The Administration's reformulation of policies affecting energy is part of the Pres-
ident's comprehensive Program for Economic Recovery, which includes elimination of exces-
sive federal spending and taxes, regulatory relief, and a sound monetary policy. When fully
implemented, the Economic Recovery Program is supposed to release the strength of the
private sector and ensure a vigorous economic climate in which the nation's problems will be
solved primarily by the American people themselves: consumers, workers, managers, inven-
tors, and investors. See UNTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, SECURING AMERICA's EN-
ERGY FuruR THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLCY PLAN 3 (DOE/S-0008, July, 1981).
57. More subtle methods of eviscerating established agencies are to cut their budgets,
fail to staff them, or staff them with people committed to the idea of dismantling them. See,
e.g., R. LrrWAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 6, at 121-32 for methods of defacto deregula-
tion. The controversies surrounding administrators, such as Anne Buford, of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, James Watt, Secretary of the Department of Interior, and James
Edwards of the Department of Energy, is evidence of President Reagan's claim to reduce
the federal involvement in the regulation of energy resources. See, e.g., Hearings before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: United States Senate on the Proposed Nomi-
nation of Governor James B. Edwards to Secretary of Energy, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Jan.
12, 1981) ("We need to remove Government management of fuels in what would otherwise
be a free market." Id.) (remarks of Senator James A. McClure). "[I]t is the private sector
that will do that production, not the government; and the free market place that will allo-
cate and reward the enormous capital investments required to support that production." Id.
at 13 (statement of James B. Edwards)). N.Y. Times, June 23, 1981, § 1, at 17, col. 5 (Mr.
Dennis Hayes, Director of Energy Department's Solar Energy Research Institute, was fired
because of policy differences with Secretary Edwards over budget cutbacks); N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1981, § 1, at 36, col. 1 (EPA's Director Anne Gorsuch aligns herself with Reagan's
economic philosophy); N.Y. Times, May 27, 1981, § 1, at 16, col. 4 (EPA cutbacks); N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1981, §, 1 at 19, col. 6 (budget cutbacks in EPA); See also N.Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1981, § 1, at 10, col. 4 (story regarding dismantling DOE); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, §
IV, at 21, col. 3 (same).
58. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1981, § 4, at 1, col. 6 (U.S. Synfuels Corp. expendi-
tures questioned by then OMB Director David Stockman). See also Even Under Reagan,
Synfuels Corp. Ready With Big Bucks for Private Projects, Nat. L. J., Feb. 6, 1982, at 228-
32. In 1981, 63 projects sought financial assistance from the Synfuels Corporation. See Reed,
Selection of Projects for Financial Assistance by the United States Synthetic Fuels Corpo-
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with government backed financial packages such as loan guaran-
tees, price supports, government participation in projects, and gov-
ernment purchases of products. President Reagan would prefer
this type of financial commitment to come from the private sector.
For Carter, energy decisionmaking and policymaking were to be
centralized in a federal bureaucracy. Reagan, consistent with the
"supply-side economics" of his Economic Recovery Program and
consistent with his disapproval of "Big Government," would like to
distribute these functions among federal and state governments
and the private sector. This shift in emphasis fragments energy
policy. Much legislation and the creation of two substantial bu-
reaucracies that are charged by law with policy formation, imple-
mentation, and decisionmaking run counter to President Reagan's
espoused preferences. The passage of the National Energy Act and
the Energy Security Act, and the establishment of these bureau-
cracies has institutionalized the conflict between the policy choices
of the Carter and Reagan administrations, thus embedding conflict
within and fragmenting energy policies.
The theme pervading the Reagan Administration's policy
choices is "economic recovery." The supply-side economics of the
President's program moves along two fronts. First, federal involve-
ment in business regulation, including energy industries, must be
lessened. Second, private investment must be stimulated. The way
the Reagan Administration applies these principles to the energy
sector illustrates the tendency of presidential policy to become
mired in established conflicts.
Reagan's proposals are motivated by his desire to trim govern-
ment spending rather than to facilitate decisionmaking. From an
economic standpoint the appropriate question is whether the re-
moval of the federal government from energy decisionmaking will
result in a less expensive and more effective policy. The answer
may well be negative.8 9
The Reagan Administration argues reduced government con-
trol will encourage the infusion of private capital into energy pro-
ration, 3 ENERGY L.J. 111-12 (1982). As of January 7, 1983 no projects were funded, one
letter of intent was issued, and two more letters of intent were scheduled to be issued. At
the conclusion of 1984, 3 projects were funded.
59. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFIcE, ANALYSIS OF ENERGY REORGANI-
ZATION SAVINGS ESTIMATES AND PLANS (EMD-82-77). (GAO found that administration costs
or savings were not reflected in the 1983 budget, the expenses of reorganization had been




duction. This point is troublesome and its wisdom questionable. In
the case of nuclear power, for example, President Reagan seems to
believe speeding up the regulatory process will make nuclear facili-
ties more attractive to private investors. The administration as-
sumes federal regulatory lag causes an increase in plant costs
thereby discouraging private investors from risking their capital.
Other authorities, however, indicate regulatory lag does not con-
tribute significantly to increased costs." Other important factors
include: inflation, increased construction costs, increased safety
costs, costs for decommissioning powerplants, underestimated
clean-up costs, increased cost of capital, and, a decline in demand
for electricity. This being the case, a speeding up of the licensing
process for nuclear plants, with perhaps an attendant increase in
risk to health and safety is a poor trade-off. Moreover, the Admin-
istration's belief the states can pick up the ball is wrongheaded.
First, in the case of nuclear power the states have only limited au-
thority."' Second, state Public Utility Commissions can fragment a
national nuclear energy policy simply by treating such issues as the
cancellation of a nuclear plant82 or a ratemaking element such as
"construction-work-in-progress" differently. 3 The simple point is
60. The financial fallout from Three-Mile Island (TMI), including increased recogni-
tion of safety hazards, increased construction costs, higher interest rates and cost of capital,
and reduced demand for electricity all contributed to a slow down in the nuclear power
industry and in plant cancellations. See, e.g., Hyman, Three Mile Island, Two Years Later
in 20 PROCEEDINGS IowA STATE UNIVERsrrY REGULATORY CONFERENCE 92 (1981); LIBERMAN,
THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT 78 (19-); SHANAHAN, TM- THE FiNANCLAL
IMPACT 69 (19.); UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (EMD-81-35, Mar. 2, 1981); Flavin, Nuclear Power: The
Market Test (Worldwatch Paper No. 57, Dec., 1983); Lowenthal, Nuclear Power's New
Peril, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1982, § 1, at 23, col. 3; McInnis, Nuclear Utilities Plagued by
Costly Equipment Breakdowns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, § F, at 4, col. 3; Large, Ills of
Nuclear Power Aren't Likely to End With Faster Licensing, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 1,
col. 1;
61. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Refer also to note 223 infra.
62. See Massachusetts Dep't of Public Utilities, No. D.P.U. 906 (Apr. 30, 1982), UTILI-
TIES LAW REPORTS. 23,690 (CCH). How costs of a plant cancellation should be carried
presents federalism problems as well. See South Dakota Public Utilities Comm. v. FERC,
690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982); A Survey of Regulatory Treatment of Plant Cancellation
Costs, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 52 (Mar. 31, 1983).
63. See, e.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n., 67 Ohio St. 2d 153
(1981); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 430 N.E.2d 684 (1981); Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., UTIL. L. REP. (State) § 23,552 (CCH) PUL Nos.
R-80061225-R 80061225C028 (Apr. 24, 1981); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM. NEEDS TO ACT ON THE CONSTITUTION-WORK-IN-PRO-
GRESS ISSUE (EMD-81-123, Sept. 23, 1981); Hahne, Why CWIP Should Be in Rate Base in
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President Reagan's "energy policy" conflicts with his economic
program and the result is a less cohesive energy policy. Addition-
ally, Reagan's more specific plans for energy must confront institu-
tionalized agency conflicts.
President Reagan also proposes to dismantle the Department
of Energy.64 The DOE was created precisely to centralize, coordi-
nate and streamline decisionmaking by the federal government.6 5
Presumably, this centralization was cost efficient in that decisions
could be made with a minimum of duplication and delay, and the
benefits of centralization would outweigh administrative costs. Dis-
mantling the DOE would restore the plethora of interagency frag-
mentation which characterized earlier energy policy. Actually,
President Carter's vision of centralization was only partially ac-
complished. Although the DOE assumed power from other existing
agencies, significant 6 interagency fragmentation continued to
exist. 
7
Another serious question posed by the dismantling of the cen-
tralized energy bureaucracies of DOE and the U.S. Synfuels Corpo-
ration is the effect will be had on research and development of al-
ternative technologies. Assuming alternative technologies are
needed for a well balanced energy program, will their development
and initial entry into the marketplace be possible without federal
19 PROCEEDINGS IOWA STATE REGULATORY CONFERENCE 445 (1980).
64. President Reagan proposed a bill to dismantle the DOE entitled, the Federal En-
ergy Reorganization Act of 1982, at a news conference on May 24, 1982. See Remarks of the
President at Signing Ceremony for Legislative Proposal Concerning the Department of En-
ergy (May 24, 1982).
65. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7111(4) (Supp. V 1981):
[R]esponsibility for energy policy regulation, and research, development and dem-
onstration is fragmented in many departments and agencies and thus does not
allow for the comprehensive, centralized focus necessary for effective coordination
of energy supply and conservation programs;...
66. The DOE, for example, was the recipient of all functions transferred from the Fed-
eral Energy Administration, the precursor to the DOE, and the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. V 1981) There were partial transfers from
the Department of the Interior, 42 U.S.C. § 7152 (Supp. V 1981), the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 42 U.S.C. § 7154 (Supp. V 1981), the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 42 U.S.C. § 7155 (Supp. V 1981), and the Department of Transportation, 42 U.S.C. §
7159 (Supp. V 1981), among others. See generally, HR GREEN, ENERGY L. GUIDE, ch. 2 (1978);
Aman, Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some Structural and Procedural Lessons, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1980) (insert e.p.); Byse, The Department of Energy Organization
Act: Structure and Procedure 30 An. L. REV. 193 (1978). The legislative history of the De-
partment of Energy Organization Act is contained in 1977 US. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS
854.
67. Aman, Id. at 516 n. 77.
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involvement? Can the energy produced by the so-called alternative
technologies stay price competitive with the energy produced by
major energy companies?
68
The overarching issue is whether the Reagan Administration's
Economic Recovery Program is compatible with a sound energy
policy. Is the move to eliminate DOE and slow down or stop the
United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation being done in a way
compatible with energy policy, or is it just another reed in an eco-
nomic wish? President Reagan's National Energy Plan is written
more as a support for his Economic Recovery Program than as a
policy which stands by itself. Thus, policy decisions are based on
economic principles which override social concerns. This emphasis
is shortsighted; it may provide temporary relief, but it must be re-
placed with something more satisfying.
Should Reagan's desire to eliminate or emasculate the DOE
come true then what will happen to the Carter legislation passed
under the National Energy Act and the Energy Security Act? Will
the Departments of Commerce and Interior adequately administer
these programs? The involvement of two agencies instead of one
will almost certainly lead to a return to "balkanization" and frag-
mentation in policymaking.
Two points should be noted. First, although less importantly
the energy policy proposals of Presidents Carter and Reagan are
internally inconsistent; this is understandable given the range and
complexity of the subject. Second, the conflicts between the Carter
and Reagan administrations is more significant than a mere differ-
ence in presidential preference or politics. The Carter and Reagan
policies not only differ on centralization or decentralization of
decisionmaking power as a matter of presidential political prefer-
ence, they differ as a matter of law. Reagan's political preferences
must confront Carter's institutionalized policies.
B. Inter and Intra Agency Conflict
Policy can easily become fragmented because of direct con-
flicts between or within agencies or because shared agency respon-
sibilities do not work out as smoothly as envisioned.69 These are
68. Refer to note 56 supra. See also Report of the Committee on Synthetic Fuels, 3
ENERGY L.J. 381 (1982).
69. Transportation of nuclear materials, for example pose such a conflict. Transporta-
tion occurs at the front and back ends of the fuel cycle. Both the Department of Transpor-
1985]
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
quintessentially bureaucratic power plays that break down sub-
stantive policy.
An example of an interagency conflict occurred in the litiga-
tion culminating in Watt v. Energy Action Educational Founda-
tion.70 Under the Outer Continental Shelflands Act Amendments
of 197871 the Secretary of DOE and the Secretary of the Interior
both have responsibility for leasing tracts of the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) for the exploration and development of mineral re-
sources, including oil and gas. Congress passed the amendments
intending to encourage domestic production of oil and gas in order
to reduce dependence on foreign oil. At the same time, environ-
mentally conscious individuals and groups wanted to protect the
fragile shoreline. The bidding system for OCS tracts had its inade-
quacies; in particular, the heavy dependence on front end cash bo-
nus-fixed royalty bidding was anti-competitive. Through the
amendments, Congress added alternative bidding systems in order
to promote competition in this market. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior has certain discretion in selecting a bidding system.72 Although
Interior conducts all lease sales, the Secretary of the DOE, in con-
sultation with Interior, must promulgate regulations governing the
use of each new bidding system.73 As a result of the Interior Secre-
tary's continued use of the cash bonus-fixed royalty bidding system
suit was filed. The complaint sought a mandatory injunction
against the Secretary of the DOE to promulgate regulations for all
alternative bidding systems authorized under the amendments.
7 4
The court found delay caused by a jurisdictional squabble between
Departments,75 and refused to grant an injunction. About a year,
later the plaintiffs in the original action were back in court press-
ing their claim for injunctive relief. Their petition was granted on
tation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have jurisdiction over nuclear materials. Al-
though a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1973 between the DOT and the
Atomic Energy Commission (NRC's predecessor) large regulatory gaps remain. See gener-
ally Trosten & Ancarrow, Federal-State-Local Relationships in Transporting Radioactive
Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road, 68 Ky. L. J. 251 (1979-80); Comment, Transportation
of Nuclear Material: The Public Challenge, 11 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 63 (1979).
70. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
71. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(b) (Supp. V 1981).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7152(b)(2) (Supp. JI 1978) (Repealed by Act of Dec. 23, 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-100, title II, § 201, 95 Stat. 1407).
74. Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 479 F. Supp. 62 (D.D.C.) aff'd., 631 F.2d
751 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
75. Id. 631 F.2d at 755, 758.
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the ground that continued delay by the Interior Department in us-
ing alternative bidding systems frustrated the essential purposes of
the act. 6 Whether the conflict between Interior and the DOE is
real or apparent is consequentially beside the point. Litigation was
necessary before a long-delayed Congressional directive could be
put into effect."
Not only is the DOE an amalgam of other agencies its own
structure contains a fragmentation of power.7 8 The DOE is an ex-
ecutive agency and significant powers are delegated to the cabinet
level office of the Secretary and to executive departments under its
control. At the same time, DOE has under its umbrella an inde-
pendent regulatory agency the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC).79 FERC has been granted the bulk of the powers
of the former Federal Power Commission together with powers as-
signed to it under the National Energy Act. This split of authority
and consequently, decisionmaking power, means cohesive energy
policy is less likely to evolve. FERC, for example, has ratemaking
authority over wellhead and pipeline rates for natural gas8o but the
Secretary exercises control over wellhead oil prices and over the
allocation of oil;81 moreover, FERC has authority to develop natu-
ral gas curtailment plans82 but the Secretary sets curtailment
priorities.
8 3
In City of Fulton v. United States84 the Secretary of the De-
partment of Energy took it upon himself to grant an interim rate
increase which affected purchasers of power from the Southwest-
ern Power Administration (SWPA). Formerly, the Department of
Interior had jurisdiction over the SWPA but this was transferred
76. Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 654 F.2d 735, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd
sub nom, Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
77. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 548 F. Supp. 466, 468-69 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (Depart-
ment of Interior conflict with Department of Energy). Although such conflicts are not the
norm, and cooperation is possible, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Zeller, 688
F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982) (DOE and Environmental Protection Agency cooperation), the
fact that policy-making authority resides in competing bureaus contributes to
fragmentation.
78. Aman, supra note 66 at 516-26.
79. 42 U.S.C. § § 7171-77 (Supp. V 1981). See also, Clark & Grenier, The Relationship
Between DOE and FERC: Innovative Government or Inevitable Headache, 1 ENERGY L. J.
325 (1980).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1981).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. V 1981).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1981).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7151, 7172(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1981).
84. 680 F.2d 115 (Ct. C1. 1982). See also cases cited at 680 F.2d at 122 n. 28.
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to the DOE. Ratemaking authority, previously within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Power Commission was later transferred to
FERC which was held to have ratemaking jurisdiction over this
matter after a jurisdictional squabble with FERC's titular head the
Secretary of DOE.
Even more curious is the power the FERC has over some deci-
sions of the Secretary. FERC's own decisions are final, and though
reviewable by the courts, they are not reviewable by the Secre-
tary.8 ' Not only does FERC retain its independent status in this
fashion, but it also has a veto power over actions taken by the Sec-
retary which may significantly affect any function within the juris-
diction of the FERC.8 6 Further, FERC has authority to review cer-
tain decisions of the Secretary. s7 The point made here is a simple
one: by its very structure the DOE has a built in, or institutional-
ized, conflict between decisionmakers within the same agency. This
conflict has the potential to fragment energy policy and, following
Murphy's law, will most likely do so when the need for a cohesive
policy is most needed.
Inter and intra agency conflicts resemble the tension between
presidential administrations concerning centralization and decen-
tralization; both are struggles for power and authority. It is the
realization that political power struggles are aligned with decision-
making structures that helps us understand the relation between
law and policy.
C. Interbranch Conflicts
Conflicts among the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches are traditional political conflicts, and are not the focus of
this article.8 Rather, the emphasis here is on legal conflicts be-
tween each constitutional branch and the fourth
branch-administrative agencies. Agencies have been delegated
85. 42 U.S.C. § § 7172(g), 7192 (Supp. V 1981).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7174 (Supp. V 1981). See also, United States v. Tex-La Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 693 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7194(b) (Supp. 1979).
88. Among these conflicts, the most serious is the current attempt by Congress to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Since the federal court system is one of limited juris-
diction and since Article IV of the Constitution directs Congress to regulate the federal
courts, some limitation can be done. The serious questions arise when Congress attempts to
tamper with federal court jurisdiction of constitutional claims. See Sager, Foreword: Consti-
tutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981).
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more policymaking responsibilities and, through rulemaking, they
have exercised more policymaking authority. The discord between
three primary branches on the one hand and agencies on the other
is one which centers on the use and exercise of lawmaking and
policymaking power which is jealously guarded by all actors within
the legal-policymaking system. As the agencies' policymaking
power continues to grow attempts will continue to be made by
other branches to curtail that power.
1. Executive v. Agency. Much of the criticisms" of adminis-
trative law has been that agencies are given too much responsibil-
ity to decide increasingly complex and equivocal issues. This trend
is coupled with a strong policy of judicial deference to administra-
tive agencies with the result agencies have considerable policymak-
ing authority.90 One check on the spread of administrative power is
the executive veto. 1
The Constitution 92 and numerous statutes s circumscribe the
limits of Presidential power. Although restrained in many respects,
the President does have significant decisionmaking authority.
94
The Executive can appoint and remove officials; the Office of Man-
agement and Budget influences, if not dominates, the purse strings
of most agencies; "executive agencies" are under the office of the
President; and, the very political nature of the President's position
influences the regulatory atmosphere for decisionmaking through
moral suasion and political rhetoric. Still, there is a belief that the
rise of policymaking in agencies must be checked through Presi-
89. Refer to note 7 supra.
90. The movement of agencies away from adjudication, which is basically a retrospec-
tive dispute resolution mechanism, to rulemaking, a forward-looking, legislative-like device,
is causing this policymaking function to increase. See, Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 43,
at 13-58; DeLong, supra note 7 at 257-60; Diver, supra note 8 at 401-410; Stewart & Sun-
stein, supra note 4 at 1232-39.
91. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L. J. 451
(1979). The executive veto is one of many devices the President can use to influence agency
action. The Executive's powers over the purse and appointments clearly thrust the executive
into agency policy.
92. U.S. CONsT. art. II.
93. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1, 14-
18 (1982).
94. The President is given express authority to establish production goals for synthetic
fuel to meet national defense needs, 50 U.S.C. § 2095(a) (Supp. IV 1980); ration motor fuel,
Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 6261 (Supp. V 1981); make ap-
pointments to the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 42 US.C. § 8712(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981);




When agencies exercise their rulemaking function, they are
promulgating policy as well as enacting law. These policy decisions
may not comport with Executive policy preferences, particularly
following a change in Administration as dramatic as the transition
from President Carter to President Reagan. Agencies can easily
make decisions which affect national policy and which are contrary
to a president's philosophy before the president can legitimately
act to align agency action with presidential preference. One mecha-
nism which is proposed to allow the president a stronger hand in
agency rulemaking is the executive veto." Much talk of regulatory
reform is grounded in the belief that most of our current economic
woes are due to the massive and costly bureaucratic and regulatory
delays industries face before they can provide goods and services.
7
Thus, the veto device is proposed in the hope that agency actions
can be coordinated with presidential policy and be made more
efficient.9 8
The drawback of the executive veto is it upsets the balance of
power in the branches of government. Even if economic efficiency
is promoted through the use of the veto, and is not guaranteed,99
the President will have exercised a power over policy that is denied
the other branches. Lawmaking is a function of both houses of
Congress with Presidential consent or with Congressional override.
The executive veto applied to agency action circumvents this pro-
cess in derogation of the inner structure of the Constitution.
95. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 91 at 453-56.
96. See generally, Note, Delegation and Regulatory Reform: Letting the President
Change the Rules, 89 YALE L. J. 561 (1980)
97. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FED-
ERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 79 (1978). See also 127 CONG. REc. S4228-31, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (April 30, 1981).
98. Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395, 1410-
11 (1975); Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79, 105-11 (1982) (state and federal mod-
els); Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1981); Symposium: Presi-
dential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 TuL. L. REv. 811 (1982).
99. Should the President exercise the veto power, then at least it means that the time
and resources consumed by the agency and other participants in the rulemaking process
have been substantially wasted. If affected parties want to challenge the veto, then litigation
expenses will be incurred.
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2. Legislature v. Agency. Agencies are creatures of the Legis-
lature yet tension between the two bodies is commonplace. Con-
gress wants to restrain agency action for the same reasons the ex-
ecutive does. One way of doing this is the legislative veto. °10
The study of energy legislation is a case in point. The Carter
Administration pushed hard for the passage of a comprehensive
national energy package. After only eighteen months of debates
and politicking the National Energy Act was passed. This was
truly crisis legislation. The "Energy Crisis" precipitated several
major bills 01 and the Congress responded relatively quickly given
the magnitude and complexity of the issues. Congress formulated a
new bureaucracy and delegated a great amount and array of pow-
ers. In its hurry, however, the Legislature may have delegated too
much responsibility with inadequate policy guidelines. One way to
check abuse of those powers was the legislative veto. Through the
veto one or both houses of Congress could invalidate some aspect
of administrative action. The United States Supreme Court heard
argument and reargument on the constitutionality of the one-
house legislative veto and has held the device invalid.10 2 In the
context of the Natural Gas Policy Act 0 3 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit declared this device
unconstitutional.
1 0 4
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) is a major part of
the National Energy Act. NGPA attempted to do several signifi-
cant things. First, by exercising pricing controls over intrastate gas
sales the dual natural gas markets (interstate and intrastate) were
unified and prices were brought into line. Second, NGPA planned
a scheduled deregulation of natural gas prices. This deregulation
was and continues to be a very controversial aspect of our national
energy policy. 0 5 Much of the controversy stems from the fear that
residential consumers will suffer unfair and disproportionate price
100. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Levinson, supra note 98, at 79-
105.
101. Refer to notes 46 and 51 supra.
102. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, (1983) (energy
legislation containing legislative vetoes that were invalidated is cited in an appendix to the
opinion).
103. 15 U.S.C. § § 3301-3432 (Supp. V 1981).
104. Consumer Energy Council of Am. V. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. See, e.g., Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L.
REv. 63, 72-74 (1982).
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increases. To remedy this problem NGPA proposed incremental
pricing of natural gas.10 These provisions limited the extent to
which increased fuel costs could be passed on to residential con-
sumers in such a way as to pass those costs instead to industrial
consumers. Congress, then, through NGPA directed FERC to issue
a rule on incremental pricing covering boiler fuel users. 10 7 In Phase
II, FERC was directed to prescribe an amendment extending incre-
mental pricing to other industrial users. 108 The Phase II rule was
to take effect after thirty legislative days, "unless, during such 30
day period of continuous session of Congress, either House of the
Congress [were to adopt] a resolution of disapproval."'109 This is a
one-house veto provision.
If we accept the characterization that the energy legislation
was passed hurriedly, and that the incremental pricing provisions
were controversial as well as complex, then the reason for the legis-
lative veto is apparent. Congress, though undecided as to a defini-
tive policy, wanted to maintain some control. While agencies ex-
panded their use of rulemaking and concomitant policymaking
powers, Congress, following a call for regulatory reform, attempted
to abort abuses of these expanded powers through the use of the
veto. The device seems harmless enough; it even seems to be good
policy management. Congress, in passing legislation, is delegating a
good deal of authority to an agency and through the legislative
veto it sought to retain some measure of control. Nevertheless, the
veto is unconstitutional.110 The United States Supreme Court in
the Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha1 1 held that
the one house veto provision of law dealing with deportation of
aliens violated the bicarmalism and presentment provisions of the
United States Constitution.1 2 For similar reasons the D.C. Circuit
previously held that the one house veto provision of the NGPA
was invalid. 13
The one-house veto runs afoul of the separation of powers
doctrine by allowing Congress to control rulemaking and poli-
106. See, Hollis, Title I and Related Producer Matters Under the NGPA, 2 ENERGY L.
SERv. MoNo 4D (1981).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 3341(a) (Supp. V 1981).
108. 15 U.S.C. 3342(a) (Supp. V 1981).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
110. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 342-3, 350.
113. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,461-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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cymaking processes after it has delegated authority. Congressional
oversight of agency action should take place before delegation not
afterwards. Further, the one-house veto bypasses the President's
signature on a bill and it effectively avoids judicial review. The leg-
islative veto process disrupts the delicate system of constitutional
checks and balances by giving Congress, and in the case of a one
house veto, only one house, a second look at agency action when no
other branch is afforded a similar opportunity. One response,
which has surface appeal, is Congress is the most "democratic" of
the branches so the second look is politically acceptable. In prac-
tice that has not been the case; decisions to veto or not have been
make primarily in committee as the result of agency-committee ne-
gotiations rather than in floor debate.114 Therefore, it is appropri-
ate that the courts have ruled that Congress may retain control
over agency actions which are within the realm of authority
granted to the agency only by conventional legislation.
In a penetrating case study of legislative vetoes Professors
Bruff and Gellhorn conclude this mechanism: does not effectuate
better policy choices; it impedes public participation while foster-
ing some interest group influence; it imposes unfavorable time con-
stralnts, delays and impasses; and, it is not politically accounta-
ble." 5 Thus, while the device purports a theory of efficient
delegation, in reality it is another layer of red tape.
There is a subtle but deep theme in this short story. Poli-
cymaking is a hazardous business. One branch cannot do it alone
and the struggle over the exercise of power is governed by two im-
portant considerations. First, there is the question of efficiency. In
the one-house veto scenario of NGPA Congress was too busy or
lacked the resources to delve deeply into the vagaries of incremen-
tal pricing, so it gave FERC permission to make the necessary
rules; nevertheless, Congress reserved the right to invalidate what
it did not like. That appears to be a fairly smooth way to proceed.
While it is true that FERC's efforts proved to be unnecessary, it
can be argued they were not wasted. FERC performed an investi-
gative task for Congress. The second issue, important to the legis-
lative policymaking scenario, is one of political expedience. Inter-
est groups, and other branches of the government, have claims on
the policymaking process and these groups should not be denied
114. Id. at 478.
115. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 100 at 1412-23.
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their right to have input in the veto process or input into rulemak-
ing. The use of the veto invalidates these powers and policymaking
is further subjected to the vagaries of the winds of politics.
3. Judiciary v. Agency. Interactions between the executive
and legislative branches and agencies present checks and balances
as well as separation of powers problems. A review of efforts to
recapture some control over agency decisionmaking and poli-
cymaking reveals the difficult position in which these branches find
themselves. Agencies as designated bodies, supposedly with exper-
tise, are delegated responsibility for overseeing problems that Con-
gress and the executive cannot. If either of these branches dele-
gates too little authority then the problems assigned to the agency
for resolution may not be adequately addressed. If the agencies are
delegated"" a great deal of power and authority, the other
branches lose control over national policy.1 7
The conflict created by the interaction between agencies and
the judiciary is of a different sort. The judiciary is thought to be
less politically accountable and thought to lack the democratic
character of the other branches. Even in the face of "legislative
failure""1 8 (where Congress fails to act or acts improperly) courts
116. Before 1937 the Supreme Court often invalidated Congressional delegations of
authority to agencies as violating the Constitution on the ground that too much power
passed to agencies. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 591-
42 (1935). Although there is some talk of reviving that doctrine, such a move seems unlikely.
See, American Textile Mfr. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring);
117. One solution to this impasse is for Congress to exercise more control by giving
agencies more pointed direction in which way substantive policy ought to go. See, B. ACKER-
MAN & W. HASLER, supra note 45 at 116-128; Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 59 TFx L. REv. 1175, 1220-22 (1981). Because of the "crisis" at-
mosphere in which energy legislation was passed, such deliberate policy choices were not
made. Another solution is more Executive control. See Cutler, The Case for Presidential
Intervention in Regulatory Rulemaking by the Executive Branch, 56 TUL. L. REv. 830, 838-
43 (1982). But see Morrison, Presidential Interference in Informal Rulemaking: Striking
the Proper Balance, 56 TuL. L. Rav. 879, 897-902 (1982).
118. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW ANm THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROcEss: FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SuPREME COURT ch. 12-24 (1980); see also Pierce &
Shapiro, supra note 117 at 1200-03. Congress fails not because its final decisions turn out to
be wrong, but because of inefficiency or unfairness. Congress also fails when it does not
function in its representative capacity because access to Congress is shared unequally by
interest groups. See, e.g., Farney & Pasztor, In the House, the Jockeying Grows Intense For
Coveted Seats on Energy Committee, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 25, col. 3:
When word got out that the 43-year old Democrat, a former lieutenant governor of
Nevada, sought a seat on the powerful committee, he was besieged by lobbyists.
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are seen as an undemocratic and an antimajoritarian branch of
government.11 Yet, the judiciary's function is to review agency ac-
tions as needs arises.
Most energy decisions are made by an administrative agency
with judicial review available in most instances. Less frequently,
courts review decisions of the Congressional120 and Executive
branch.121 Courts operate as a stabilizing force by deciding dis-
putes and acting as a check on the other arms of government. This
judicial checking function has been greatly expanded by the in-
crease in public law, the increase in decisions by rulemaking rather
than adjudication, 122 and the consequent increase in policymaking.
Courts are given express limitations1 23 and set standards for review
by the Administrative Procedures Act and enabling legislation.1 24
Within these guidelines the standards for judicial review have
some flexibility.12 5 Courts have broadened their reviewing discre-
tion, 26 sometimes to the point of being chastized by higher appel-
Even some of his fellow lawmakers tried to twist his arm. They all pledged, in
advance, to vote their way on clean-air legislation, natural-gas price decontrol, and
other intensely controversial issues.
119. CHOPER, supra note 118 at 25-45; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRus. A THEORY
OF JUDIcIAL REvIEw 4-7 passim (1980); A. BicKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
120. Refer to notes 98-107 supra and accompanying text.
121. Independent Gasoline Marketers Council v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618
(D.D.C. 1980) (review of President Carter's imposition of a 10% conservation fee).
122. See, Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Pierce, The
Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy
Policy, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (1979).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
124. The Department of Energy Organization Act, for example, establishes a slightly
different set of administrative procedures in some instances, 42 U.S.C. § 7192 (Supp. V
1981).
125. See, Comment, Davis, Judicial Review of Rulemaking: New Patterns and New
Problems, 1981 DuKE L. J. 279; Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process" An In-
conclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 201, 201-15 (1981); Verkuil, Judicial Review of In-
formal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TuL. L. RFv. 418 (1981); Verkuil,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974); Developments in the
Law: Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking and Adjudication, 1982 DUKE L. J. 393; Note,
Regulatory Analysis and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 YALE L. J. 739, 743-
46 (1982) (argues that perhaps the best that courts can do to curb abuse of agency poli-
cymaking is to insist that agencies maintain proper forms of internal management).
126. See, DeLong, supra note 8 at 262-84; Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Over-
sight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 I-hRv. ENv'L. L. Rxv. 191 (1980);
Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARv. L. Rxv.
1805, 1811 (1978); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure




Courts are not reluctant to create remedies and thus, fashion
rights, for parties involved in administrative proceedings. If an
agency fails to act, a court will force action. If rights are not vindi-
cated by an agency, courts will provide a forum. If an agency exer-
cises unwarranted authority, a court can offer protection from the
improper use of agency power. And, if a person is denied some-
thing to which he or she is properly entitled, a hearing procedure
may be available. Each of these judicial responses is a reaction to
inadequate administrative processes. Courts, generally, have not
been reluctant to correct agency deficiencies if, in the view of the
court, the agency has not followed its charge. Most of these correc-
tive actions have been taken to protect individual liberty or prop-
erty interests rather than to further or to articulate collective pol-
icy goals.128 Nevertheless, this judicial attitude toward public law
litigation necessarily affects policymaking.
129
The judiciary tends to avoid interfering with public poli-
cymaking by deferring to agency action.13 0 As administrative
127. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). (In this case the Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals abused its reviewing authority by telling the NRC to employ rulemaking rules in
excess of those required by the APA). The issue was again before that body, and the NRC
was affirmed, see Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983). See generally, Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the
Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Rodgers, A Hard Look at Ver-
mont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L. J. 699 (1979); Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. REv. 345
(1978).
128. Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Liti-
gation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 4 at 1202-20 and 1246-
1316.
129. In A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) Professor Calabresi chroni-
cles the ways courts can undercut, avoid, and otherwise get around statutes thought to be
useless or obsolete. In this regard courts make policy. The legitimacy of how courts go about
making policy is of fundamental Constitutional importance. See A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES ch. IX.
130. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Stewart, supra
note 7 at 1671-88; Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM.
L. REv. 258, 260-79 (1978).
The cases citing the principle of deference are legion. Recent energy cases in which
courts defer to agency "policy" include: Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of N. H. v. NRC,
690 F.2d 1025, 1030-33 (D.C. Cir. 1982); West Virgina. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. DOE, 681 F.2d
847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1982); East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 677 F.2d 531, 535 (6th
Cir. 1982); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976). These cases, as well as
the run-of-the-mill "deference" cases are somewhat incoherent about exactly when courts
trigger the deference rule and about exactly what the subject matter is to which courts
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agency politics change and as the social and economic problems
facing them change, courts must redefine their place in the poli-
cymaking structure. They have tended to step into the policymak-
ing network in ever increasing instance. Through procedural and
jurisdictional devices courts can subvert agency policy by delay or
can order reconsideration and reevaluation by remand.
When an agency promulgates a rule under informal rulemak-
ing procedures, courts may call for closer scrutiny. 13 1 Where the
rules address complex technical, economic, and social issues such
as those that characterize energy problems, there is more room for
varying interpretations of law, of facts, or of policy. An agency ex-
hibits biases which build up during its lifetime of regulating broad
areas of the economic system.132 Consequently, courts have been
willing to scrutinize this type of far-reaching agency decisionmak-
ing more closely.
Although courts display a willingness to give agency rules a
"hard look""' they are aware that the issues they are called on to
review may be polycentric and open to varying interpretations.
The expert agency is generally in a better position to evaluate the
issues,134 and therefore, agency decisions may be handled with a
"kid glove."13 5 Courts do not have the resources to gather scientific
defer. The "rule of deference" then, because of the mass of cases, can be seen as a series of
rules and meta-rules. This subject, however, deserves further explication in another article.
Courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for the substantive decisions agencies
make. They are more deferential towards the choice of methods agencies use to make deci-
sions. See infra § H; see also New York v. E.P.A., 716 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1983); City of
New York v. Dept. of Transp. 715 F.2d 732, 754 (2nd Cir. 1983); California v. Watt, 712 F.2d
584, 596 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, U.S--, (1983) ("The Secretary was therefore free
to choose any methodology 'so long as it is not irrational'."); Village of False Pass v. Watt,
565 F. Supp. 1123, 1147-51 (D. Alaska 1983).
131. In informal rulemaking cases courts have held that the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard and the "substantial evidence" test may converge. See, National Small Shipments
Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ECEE, Inc. v. FERC,
611 F.2d 554, 565 n.22 (5th Cir. 1980).
132. See, e.g., S. Bnavsn, REGULMTION AND ITS REFORM 10 (1982); B. OWEN & R. BRAu-
TIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME (1981); Note, Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 91 YALE L J. 739, 740-41 (1982).
133. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
134. The court does not inquire into the wisdom of the regulation that the agency
promulgates. "[It] inquire[s] into the soundness of the reasoning by which the Commission
reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported." United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972).
135. Rodgers, supra note 126 at 216-18. See also, Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061,
1070-71 (5th Cir. 1975).
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data and perform the sophisticated scientific, technological and ec-
onomic analyses agencies are established to undertake in further-
ance of Congressional mandates.136 Courts are caught in a dilemma
between the desire to closely oversee agency decisionmaking and
the desire to defer to agency expertise.
137
Energy decisions rarely involve two-sided disputes over simple
matter such as property damage, or the extent of an individual's
entitlement or the resolution of a past dispute. Rather, energy de-
cisions are multi-layered, many-partied, future-looking bundles of
positive and normative issues. Because energy decisions frequently
affect such fundamental social institutions such as the economy,
and the extent of government intervention in society, the deci-
sionmaker is frequently put into a position of having to weigh the
issues. The type of judicial review and the weighing and ordering
that a court chooses can be determinative. There are no precise
rules which exist to guide courts in making these choices. Different
judges have-developed different judicial philosophies with regard
to court review of an expert agency's decision in cases with scien-
tific, technical, economic or social complexities. Judge Harold
Leventhal the author of the opinion first enunciating the "hard
look" standard'3 " wrote courts, "would be the first to agree, indeed
proclaim, that they are not technicians and cannot themselves ei-
ther decide technological disputes, or draw on their own knowledge
for a ruling on whether an agency's determination is proper."139
While it is true courts (especially appellate courts) are neither
designed nor equipped to do basic scientific and technical fact-
finding necessary to test or evaluate hypotheses, it is also true
agencies are not necessarily in vastly superior positions. The more
scientifically complex the case, the more subject to the vagaries of
proof it is. Although courts cannot conduct initial scientific or
technical inquiries they do have special expertise in methods of
proof and about the processes by which matters are proven. Thus,
Judge Levanthal states, no matter how narrowly one may wish to
define the scope of judicial review:
136. Yellin, supra note 3 at 494-508.
137. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 118 at 1192-94, prefer to let courts defer to agency
expertise. See also, Pierce, supra note 122 at 27-30.
138. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
139. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
P. L. REv. 509, 532 (1974).
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[T]he court will not be confined to bare formalities but will probe
the entire record to identify the choices made by the agency, to
determine whether there has been a disregard of ascertainable
legislative intent to assure itself that the parties were offered a
reasonable opportunity to present their position, and to find
whether there has been a reasonable assessment of the interre-
lated policy and legal questions."1 0
Scientific or technical decisions "involve painful value choices,
and pose difficult policy problems, ' 141 which is further complicated
by the intervention of government regulation. While scientists may
be in the best position to conduct basic research and assess costs
and benefits of an individual innovation, they are not necessarily
the best evaluators of how innovation should be applied to society.
Rather, Congress, in the law authorizing the delegation, may have
signaled the path that an agency should follow, and courts can en-
sure that agencies follow this established path. Judge David
Bazelon outlines the proper role for courts and judges:
What courts and judges can do, however-and do well when con-
scious of their role and limitations-is scrutinize and monitor the
decisionmaking process to make sure that it is thorough, com-
plete, and rational; that all relevant information has been consid-
ered; and that insofar as possible, those will be affected by a deci-
sion have had an opportunity to participate in it.
142
Judges Leventhal and Bazelon exemplify an emerging phenome-
non-the expanded role of the judge in public law controversies.1
4
1
The expansion of agency policymaking, a corollary increase in
areas of potential error, increased judicial activism, and the Su-
preme Court's attitude of restraint as evidenced in Vermont Yan-
140. Id. at 541.
141. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through The Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 819 (1977).
142. Id. at 823.
143. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 376-80, 386-414 (1982) (empha-
sizing pre-trial case management as a "new form of judicial activism"). See also, CALABRES,
supra note 4 at 52:
What I shall do is to try to compare the institutional capacities of administrative
agencies with those that courts and legislators can bring to these tasks. In this way
I hope to indicate why agencies cannot legitimately solve the problem of legisla-
tive obsolescence - why, in other words, there is an important common law, judi-
cial function in the updating of outmoded laws. This function requires courts to
make use of the particular skills that administrative agencies have, but it cannot
rely on those skills.
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kee,144 have prompted numerous proposals for reform.1"
These reform efforts highlight the basic conflict between agen-
cies and courts in the area of public law decisionmaking. The judi-
ciary should not be overly deferential when reviewing agency ac-
tions. If courts are to take their role seriously they then become
part of the policymaking process. Yet, as they do, the policy deci-
sions of agencies are subjected to being second guessed, over-
turned, delayed, drastically altered by a jealous judiciary or rubber
stamped by a passive one. The question as to when to use a rubber
stamp or when to intervene remains unsettled and the finality of
substantive policy is ambiguous.
The theme emerging from a review of these structural conflicts
is that as agencies or constitutional branches attempt to define
their roles and exercise their power and authority policy is splin-
tered. The smooth interaction of law and policy is a myth. Too
many forces combine to preclude the coalescence of a coherent, let
alone complete, national policy in a field such as energy. The struc-
tural framework within which decisions are made is but one facet
144. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Refer to notes 118-120 supra and accompanying text.
145. A proposal in Congress entitled the Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1080, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess.; 127 CONG. REc. at 7938 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1981); 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REc. H. 519 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1982), amends the judicial review section of the APA by
changing the circumstances under which an agency's actions may be set aside by a reviewing
court. This new section recognizes the distinction between fact and policy and leaves the
agency its discretionary authority in making policy choices. It requires, however, the review-
ing court to take an independent look at the factual bases for the agency rule. Id. Thus,
where a finding of fact is necessary to support a rule the court must analyze the factual
predicate for the rule. Where the agency's policy choice would fail to satisfy the "arbitrary,
capricious, and abuse of discretion" standard absent such a factual finding, or where the
"finding of fact" is an asserted basis of the rule, the factual findings must meet the "sub-
stantial support" standard clause of the regulatory reform legislation. Courts are given more
discretion under the proposed Bumpers Amendment to the APA.
Other reform efforts would alter the institutional structure of energy decisionmaking by
creating specialized courts such as a Science Court. See Caspar, Technology Policy and De-
mocracy: Is the Proposed Science Court What We Need, 194 SCIENCE 29 (1976); Kantro-
witz, The Science Court Experiment: Criticisms and Responses, 33 BULL. ATOM. SCL 44
(1977); Kantrowitz Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 Ahi SCIENTIST 505, 506-07
(1975); Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1058 (1977); Science
Court: High Officials Back Test of Controversial Concept, 194 SCIENCE 167, 169 (1976);
Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
Technology, the Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653-59
(1976); Another option might involve special "consensus-finding" forums where issues, such
as energy questions and other complex matters are examined, M. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CON-
SCIENCE (1980). It has also been suggested that there be expanded use of masters in order to
give a reviewing court the opportunity to render a "second opinion" on agency actions. Yel-
lin, supra note 3 at 555-60.
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of this splintering process. The system of checks and balances be-
tween legal structures means there is a constant interplay between
actors competing for power. No actor, no agency, no branch can
accumulate too much power without being stopped. The structures
of decisionmaking guarantee this. While it is true policy formation
is impeded because of jurisdictional jealousies, policy choices are
not completely ad hoc and chaotic. The choices are narrowed by
political norms which tolerate some degree of authority grabbing.
This political element is the first of two parts which constitute the
matrix in which law and policy operate.
Other reasons exist which also prevent the development of a
comprehensive substantive energy policy. Next, this Article ad-
dresses the methodologies used in decisionmaking. Although the
methodologies contain conflicts which interfere with substantive
policymaking, those conflicts are held together by the second ele-
ment, the economic branch, of the policymaking complex.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL CONFLICTS
Where issues consist of political, scientific, economic, social
and normative uncertainties that span generations in some in-
stances, decisionmakers are thrust into a paradoxical situation.
146
In the face of vast uncertainties, methods are needed to make the
mass of data intelligible. The paradox is that, as the issues become
more open-ended and amorphous, and the need for certainty and
substantive decisions is greatest, decisionmakers are forced to use
methods that are reductionist for the purpose of winnowing and
marshalling empirical data. The direction in which the methods
are reductionist therefore colors the outcome. This is not a grand
insidious plot by corporate interests or elite groups to dominate a
political culture. Rather, the choice of effective, understandable
methods is borne from a need for certainty, which is approximately
achieved through the use of identifiable and understandable crite-
ria. This is a normal institutional, even personal, response to com-
plex disputes.
The two dominant methods of energy decisiomaking are
146. The operative language is that "decisions are required to be made." See, e.g.,
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L. J. 729, 781-83
(1979) (these uncertainties do not preclude decisions being made and the decisions that are
made turn on political criteria rather than scientific or empirical criteria).
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ratemaking and cost-benefit analysis. These are inherently com-
plex and difficult methods. The risk is that decisionmakers can
place too much reliance on them as the principle means of deci-
sionmaking. These methods are biased too heavily in favor of
quantification and they are not and, indeed cannot be, uniformly
applied. Both ratemaking and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are
based on simple mathematical formulae. In fact as stated, the final
calculation for both are basic mathematical statements-but so is
E=MC2. While neither methodology is as revolutionary as the the-
ory of relativity, in the hands of bureaucrats both approach its
complexity.
A. Ratemaking
The accepted formula for ratemaking is: R = 0 + (B) r.
1 7
Once the variables are defined it is child's play to find the revenue
requirement R by adding operating expenses 0 to the rate base B
multiplied by the rate of return r. The trick is in finding univer-
sally accepted or satisfactory definitions for each of the variables.
What constitutes 0 is comparatively non-controversial compared
with the other variables. Even so, there are occasionally grey areas.
Costs incurred in operating and maintaining a business must be
recouped if the business is to continue to operate. Yet are all of
these costs to be attributed to the ratepayers, or are some to be
absorbed by the shareholders? Generally, only those costs associ-
ated with the prudent management of the firm, such as executive
salaries, are considered operating expenses which are passed
through to the ratepayers.148 Occasionally, public service commis-
sions or legislatures step in to settle questions concerning operat-
ing expenses. The New York Public Service Commission, for exam-
ple, promulgated an order prohibiting electric utilities from using
bill inserts to argue its position on controversial issues, such as its
pro-nuclear policy. This was struck down by the Supreme Court as
violative of the First Amendment. 149 Yet, the issue of who should
147. C. PmLLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 130 (1965). See also J. BONBRIGHT,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILrY RATES (1961); R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC
REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES 130 (1976); A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONS 45-139 (1969).
148. See, West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 72-76
(1935); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 289 (1923).
149. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of New York, 447 U.S. 530,
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bear these expenses is not settled. The Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978 favors collecting these expenses from sharehold-
ers rather than ratepayers. 150 This position is not based on effi-
ciency criteria; rather, a political value choice is being made that
owners, not ratepayers, should bear the cost.
The more controversial variables are B and r. What goes into
the rate base and what constitutes a reasonable rate of return are
issues that consume the bulk of the time of utility commissions. Of
the two, r is relatively easy to calculate insofar as it reflects the
current cost of money in the marketplace. 51 Rate base, however,
presents vastly more difficult issues and choices. An example of
current controversy is how to handle what is known as construc-
tion-work-in-progress (CWIP). Basically, B is comprised of the
capital investment or assets "used by and useful to" the firm in
producing its products or services. Thus, the depreciated value of
plant and equipment currently in use easily falls into the rate
base. 152 A harder issue concerns capital invested in plants under
construction or capital expended in plants that have been can-
celled due to adverse economic conditions. This confusion is
acutely felt in the nuclear power industry where regulatory lag can
last over a decade. Should the firm be allowed a return on invest-
ment for money used for plants not on line and may never be on
line? 53 If so, ratepayers are paying for utility service they are not
currently receiving. The pressure on electric utilities to attract cap-
ital has caused several state commissions to allow some CWIP ex-
penses in the rate base. The General Accounting Office has also
recommended that FERC establish a rulemaking procedure to al-
low CWIP in the rate base on a case by case basis and the FERC
has complied.15 4 As a methodology, the formula as presented is
533-35 (1980).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 2623(b)(5) (Supp. V 1981); 15 U.S.C. § 3203(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
151. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n. v. FERC, 688 F.2d 357 361-62 (5th Cir.
1982); East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 686 F.2d 430 435-39 (6th Cir. 1982).
152. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. FERC, 668 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1981); City of
Charlottesville, Va. v. FERC, 661 F.2d 945, 951-54 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
153. This delay, together with rising construction costs, high interest rates, and soften-
ing projections of electric power demand, is forcing the cancellation of nuclear power plants.
See Large, "NRC Sees Utilities Canceling or Delaying 19 Nuclear Plants Currently Being
Built," Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1982 at 13, col. 1; and note 60 supra. In Jaco, no new nuclear
power plant has been ordered since 1978, and approximately 100 plants, many under con-
struction have been cancelled. See generally, Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mis-
takes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1984).
154. General Accounting Office, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Needs to Act
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facially simple, but is inherently complex in application.
Utility decisions also have a political dimension. While the
handling of CWIP and cancellation costs might seem to be an ac-
counting problem, it is fundamentally political. If CWIP is in-
cluded in the rate base then ratepayers bear the cost; if it is ex-
cluded, shareholders bear the cost. The utility commissions are
responsible for deciding who shall pay.
155
Commissions gravitate toward quantification and positive is-
sues rather than full expositions of normative, political and value
issues. In ratemaking, issues of rate design and rate structure 56
directly affect non-economic concerns such as redistribution of
wealth, subsidization of classes of consumers, subsidization within
classes,157 cross-subsidization,'5 8 environmental protection, and
conservation. 5 ' Even then, many assumptions are left unexamined
or are accepted by default. Once a utility commission moves ahead
with a ratemaking case questions concerning the need for the util-
ity itself, the adequacy of existing plants, reliability of service, ex-
cess capacity, decreasing demand, and alternative sources of en-
ergy are only superficially examined at best. Most of the
commission's energy is devoted to coming up with a quantifiable R.
The choice of a decisionmaking methodology can obscure
deeper value issues. The institutions using traditionial rulemaking
readily rely on the above formula because it appears understanda-
ble and it simplifies what is at heart a polycentric decision com-
prising normative as well as positive issues. But in order to make
effective decisions the assumptions and limitations inherent in the
use of such a formula must be recognized and evaluated.
Given most ratemaking is done at the state level, and several
federal agencies also exercise this function, ratemaking standards
are not uniformly applied. Different public service commissions
on the Construction-Work-In-Progress Issue, EMD-81-123, (Sept. 23, 1981). See also, 19
Proceedings, Iowa State Regulatory Conference on Public Utility Valuation and the Rate-
Making Process 445-69 (1980).
155. See El Paso Elec. Co. v. FERC, 667 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1982).
156. See generally Second Taxing Dist. of Norwalk v. FERC, 683 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
157. Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. FERC, 653 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
158. See Arizona Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. ICC, 675 F. 2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982); San
Antonio v. United States, 631 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
United States, 606 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
159. L. THURow, THE ZERO-SUM SocmT= 191-92 (1980); Aman & Howard, Natural Gas




utilize different accounting standards and different depreciation
methods, treat factors such as CWIP differently, and compute the
rate of return differently as well. The manipulation of formulae
has various economic effects. The way commissions choose to han-
dle these effects is essentially political. Although ratemaking pur-
ports to be an economic calculus and is written in the language of
economics it is not soley an economic problem. The issues raised in
a ratemaking hearing by parties or interested persons are not only
economic questions. They are political issues1 60 of the first order. It
is not that public utility commissions and public utilities are in-
volved in a cabal against consumers. Rather, their familiarity with
the decisionmaking procedure and their choice of a quantifiable,
positive calculus weighted in favor of efficiency criteria channels
the decisionmaking into an economic structure, even though these
decisions must be rendered in a highly political environment.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is a methodology used to decide which,
among competing public projects, will maximize social benefits and
minimize social costs.16 Like ratemaking it is capable of a simple
formulation: "Is the benefit greater than the cost?" Also, like
ratemaking, the simple statement of the formula obscures the com-
plexity of its application and, more importantly, can mask hidden
assumptions inherent in its use.
Cost-benefit analysis can be divided into four problematic
stages. First, costs, benefits, and risks must be identified. Although
risks can be translated into costs it is unwise to do so uncritically.
In assessing the wisdom of locating a nuclear waste disposal facility
at geographic point A or B, for example, a calculation which trans-
lates risks into costs may yield a result which indicates point A is
less costly than point B. The decision is made, then, on the basis of
the relative costs and benefits of locating the disposal site at point
A or B and does not directly address the question of whether the
risk itself is socially acceptable. A political issue is obscured by ec-
onomic analysis.162 Translating risks to costs assumes risks at ei-
160. See, FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 upheld against federalism challenges). Refer to Part IV infra.
161. L. ANDERSON & R Sm'rLE, BENEFrr-CosT ANALYSIS: A PRAcnCAL GumE (1977);
E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 1976).
162. Starr & Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, 208 SCINCE 1114 at 19 (June 1980):
The usefulness of these methods in making assumptions and values explicit justi-
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ther point are acceptable.1 3 It also assumes that the risks are
quantifiable and that the method of quantification is compara-
tively and internally consistent.
The three remaining stages of cost-benefit analysis present
similar difficulties. It is no easy task to classify an event as a bene-
fit or a cost. 6 4 Moreover, many variables are impossible to quan-
tify. Who, for example, can confidently quantify the value of a
human life? 6 5 The final major stage is the presentation of infor-
mation. This entails outlining the assumptions on which the pres-
entation is being made and the implications of those assumptions.
Present in this stage are both problems of interpretation and of
selection of data which will differ depending on who is doing the
interpreting and why the presentation is being made.
fies their application. But a necessary condition for applying their results to spe-
cific decisions is a social consensus on the relative benefits and costs of the pro-
posed actions. For specific types of risk, in which intuitive evaluations of risk and
benefit contradict analytic evaluations, the necessary consensus may not develop,
but rather a conflict requiring political resolution is likely to result.
163. An important and often neglected variable in cost-benefit analysis is that risk
taking has at least two distinct and conflicting forms. As individuals, we make private
choices about risks every day. Some people voluntarily risk their lives in hazardous occupa-
tions, for example. The amount of risk that is privately and voluntarily taken, however, is
distinct from the amount of risk that we would tolerate as citizens when those risks are
imposed by the state. Individual homeowners have little power or voice as to where a nu-
clear power plant is located. Thus, large scale decisions often impose transaction costs that
individuals simply cannot absorb. See, Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69
VA. L. REv. 1025, 1054-58 (1983); Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us, or, Con-
flict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENv'L. L. 283, 286-88 (1982); Starr &
Whipple, supra note 162 at 1116-17;
164. See Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment in Energy Policy, 45 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 911 (1977). In deciding whether to require a coal gasification plant to install scrubbers,
for example, how should the cost of the scrubber be weighed? Direct benefits might include
the contribution to the GNP of the value of the domestic production of a natural gas substi-
tute. If the decision is made to enforce the requirement, some plants will never be built
because the cost of installation is so high. We should assume that because coal gas is
thought to be a useful commodity, somewhere in the industry research money and time will
be spent looking for cleaner ways to process coal gas. How is the money to be used in anti-
pollution research and development in the industry to be carried in the cost-benefit equa-
tion? Is it really a cost of the decision because the money would not have been spent other-
wise? Or, is it truly a benefit in that a new industry is created, i.e., coal gasification anti-
pollution research and development, and if successful, there will be cleaner air and more
coal gasification plants, which may be more competitive as industry concentration is less-
ened, so the price of the product should be down and consumers will be satisfied. The extra-
polation of costs and benefits can be carried out indefinitely. It is a non-economic decision
to stop the extrapolation at any point.
165. For example, the "cost per life saved" in various federal government programs
ranges from $35,550 to $624,976,000. LrrwAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 6 at 11; Crovitz,
Costs in a Regulated Society, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1981, at 18, col. 4.
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This methodology has not been without critics.168 The criti-
cisms center not so much around what the analysis can do, i.e.,
gather data and information and highlight sensitive normative and
positive issues, as much as on its application and the importance
given in decisionmaking.1 67 Advocates of cost-benefit analysis see it
as a way to deal with large masses of complex and often conflicting
data. 68 The method should not be used, however, to obscure the
equally, if not more delicate, moral and social issues that occur
within the context of the allocation of scarce resources. A political
and philosophical question underlies the criticism of cost-benefit
analysis: Is this method, which places emphasis on hard, idealized
objective data, desirable (or even workable) in a pluralistic democ-
racy? 69 Do we want, can we afford, a society, or for that matter a
legal regime, favoring "scientific" facts derived from quantified cal-
culations and favors positive economic data over "softer" norma-
tive choices? The degree to which this method is used by decision
makers also poses as important power and authority ques-
tion: Where will decision making power settle? Will it move away
from democratic assemblies, like legislatures, toward scientific and
technological communities, or toward specialized elite bureaucratic
institutions?
The question of the proper role for cost-benefit analysis in the
law170 was presented to the Supreme Court in American Textile
166. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmen-
tal Decisionmaking, 4 HAv. ENv'L L. REv. 191 (1980); Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady
of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are Not All Economic, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 1283 (1981);
Williams, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Natural Resources Decisionmaking: An Economic and
Legal Overview, 11 NAT. RES. LAW 761 (1979).
167. See, e.g., J. FISHKIN, TYRANNYmD LEGrIMACY: A CRrTIQuE OF PoLTmCAL THEO-
RIES, 91-96 (1979) (Too much reliance on such a method can lead to tyranny, such as a
governmental policy choice which imposes severe deprivations on anyone); Kennedy, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 413, 422-44
(1981). (Professor Kennedy argues that much cost-benefit analysis is "indeterminate").
168. Agencies are being called upon to make decisions which are becoming increas-
ingly complex. The complexity stems from technical problems which include an expanding
but inconclusive data base, disagreement among experts on methods of using data, and lack
of a consensus regarding findings and their interpretation. Regulators must also compute
low probabilities and high cost events while assessing diverse and changing values in a plu-
ralistic society. In energy regulation these problems are exacerbated by a feeling of crisis
management. All of these factors pull agencies toward using cost-benefit analysis and
ratemaking. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 479-81 (1980).
169. Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspec-
tive, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 901 (1977).
170. Cost-Benefit Analysis, curiously, has become a major methodology in environ-
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Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.17 1 Representatives of
the cotton industry challenged the "cotton dust standard" arguing
that OSHA required the standard to reflect a reasonable relation-
ship between costs and benefits and, if the proposed standard were
enforced, the costs imposed on industry would greatly outweigh
any health benefits accrued by workers. The government and two
labor organizaztions claimed OSHA mandated that the Secretary
of Labor to set the most protective standard feasible to eliminate a
significant risk of material health impairment. The majority opin-
ion, relying on Justice Marshall's dissent in an earlier case,17 2 held
cost-benefit analysis could not be used to override the express pur-
pose of legislation. Congress, when it promulgated OSHA, defined
the basic relationship between costs and benefits by placing the
benefit of workers' health above all other considerations. The
Court reasoned if Congress intends an agency to engage in cost-
benefit analysis the statute will so state.
173
American Textile does not preclude the use of cost-benefit
mental decisionmaking. Although the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4374
(Supp. V 1981), does not explicitly allow this method, see W. ROGFRS, EmrmoNVxNTL LAW
745-47 (1977), other statutes do. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1981), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1982).
171. 452 U.S. 490 (1981); see also, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HAv. L. Rv.
93, 319-29 (1981).
172. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
173. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §
1347(b) (Supp. V 1981); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(c)
(Supp. V 1981). Sometimes this appears in regulations, see, e.g., 10 C-Y.R. § 51.23(c) (1982).
LITWAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 6 at 93 make the following argument against statutes
which set a standard other than one based on cost-benefit analysis:
Such language elevates the chosen regulatory objective to an absolute-a goal to
be attained regardless of the costs imposed or of the effects that may be imparted
to other objectives. In some cases, of course, society has decided to do precisely
that or, in Arthur Okun's words, to put certain institutions outside the "domain of
dollars." There are sound reasons, for example, not to allow economic costs to
compromise our abhorrence of slavery, our commitment to freedom of speech, or
the prohibition of a market in votes. But to impose an absolute imperative against
carcinogenic food additives, health risks to workers, or unhealthful environmental
exposure to ozone? Such an idea mocks serious political discourse. If we will not
allow any risks on ozone, how can we allow smoking in public? Why is our health
budget limited but our regulatory budget limitless? How can we reconcile a zero-
risk philosophy when there are no safe levels of exposure? And, to be realistic,
how can we hold such a position when the implication may be that our entire
national income should be spent on pursuing absolute safety?
The authors answer their own questions. There are certain things society will not toler-
ate no matter how costly. There are others it will tolerate even if that toleration is
inefficient.
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analysis, but it does prohibit its use to subvert other express stan-
dards of a statute. This position reaches the heart of the criticism
concerning cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is ultimately
dependent on quantification that will promote "efficiency." The
method is reductive in that it, like the ratemaking formula, ob-
scures or ignores political issues.
Cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool. It is capable of pointing
out and highlighting positive and empirical data that are useful for
formulating policy and making policy decisions. Nevertheless, the
method is also capable of distortion, particularly the distortion of
normative and political issues. The method cannot be the sole
decisionmaking method because public policy decisions must also
account for normative and broader social issues, the variables of
which are difficult if not impossible to quantify. The American
Textile case wisely recognizes that decisionmaking may be too
complex to be left to the dictates of a mathematical equation.
Some administrative reform efforts 74 have attempted to increase
dependence on cost-benefit analysis. This evidences a narrow-
mindedness that places mathematical efficiency above all other
considerations. Quantitative methods appeal to our need for cer-
tainty and our need for decisions by providing hard, positive data;
they yield answers when asked. 75 Nevertheless, they also deem-
phasize normative issues.17 6 They eschew individual value choices
in favor of an equation by assuming that everyone's value choices
are entitled to equal weight. This assumes too much and it obvi-
ously ignores the fact that certain values are better than others.
Finally, quantitative formulas reduce everything-even the non-re-
174. Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193-98 (Feb. 19, 1981). See also, Sympo-
sium, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Decision-Making: An Analysis of Executive Order
No. 12,291, 23 ARuz. L. REv. 1195 (1981); S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REc. at
S.4228.
175. See Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis-An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION 33 (Jan/
Feb. 1981); Kennedy, supra note 167; Lovins, supra note 162; Sagoff, supra note 166. Wil-
liams, supra note 166; Rodgers, supra note 166; The methods can be consequentialist, rela-
tivistic, deterministic and reductionist. They contain a technological and economic bias in
which society trades off individuality in favor of compromise for the collectivity. It is conse-
quentialist because it favors ends, not means. The bottom line of the equation is more im-
portant than how the figure was reached. It is deterministic because an assumption has been
made that all net quantified benefits are good per se. As demonstrated by American Textile,
unquantifiable worker safety, as a matter of principle and as a societal value, may be more
important than the costs to the industry.
176. Worker safety decisions, for example, involve essentially political allocations of
costs. See generally Kelman, supra note 175; Rogers, supra note 166.
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ducible-to dollars, and policy decisions are made on that basis. 177
In E.F. Schumacher's words, money then becomes the "highest of
all values.
'178
The central conflict that characterizes decisionmaking meth-
odologies is that essentially positive economic efficiency tools are
applied by essentially normative political actors in a world where
economics and politics often clash.17 9 It is not that the methods
themselves are worthless; they are useful tools to gather informa-
tion, but they should not be given too much weight. Each of these
methods accepts problematical economic assumptions about the
nature of man and the nature of a good society. 80 These assump-
tions can be carried through the decisionmaking process without
question. For policymaking, too much reliance on these methods
supresses normative issues and therefore distorts the result. In the
same way that decisionmaking structures are aligned with political
values, decisionmaking methodologies are joined with economic
values. Even assuming that energy policy is overwhelmingly an ec-
onomic matter, crucial social and political issues remain central to
its formation. These subtler issues must not be suppressed by
methodology.
V. SUBSTANTIVE RULES CONFLICTS
It has been argued here that the decisionmaking structures
which exist to formulate and implement energy policy are so mired
in conflicts that comprehensive substantive policymaking is unreal-
istic. It is also argued that conflicts and contradictions are present
in the methodologies used and that these contribute to a splinter-
ing of policy as well. The structures have a political orientation
while the methods are economic. In addition to these structures
and methodologies, substantive legal rules themselves are a force
177. Tolchin, Regulation and the Economist, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1983, § 3 at 4, col.
3.
178. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 44 (1973).
179. See Sagoff, supra note 163, at 286-88; Sagoff, supra note 166, at 1285.
180; See C. FRID, IIGHT AND WRONG ch. 4 (1978); Kennedy, supra note 167, at 410-11;
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv.
1015, 1020-24 (1978); Kennedy & Michelnan, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 711, 713-14 (1980); Kennedy, Distribution and Paternalistic Motives in Con-
tract and Tort Law, With Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargain-
ing Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79
MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1402-18 (1981); Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 799, 801-02.
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that prevents the emergence of a whole energy policy. Substantive
rules are often stated at a level of generality that allows the recon-
ciliation of competing economic and political interests. This sec-
tion examines some legal rules that are broad enough to allow an
interplay of economic and political norms.
A. The Commerce Clause and State Taxation of Natural
Resources
Recently, the Supreme Court issued three opinions on state
taxation of natural resources.181 Each case is consistent with estab-
lished constitutional law principles, but they are not consistent
with a national energy policy. An argument can be made that the
"energy crisis" requires a concerted national effort to promote do-
mestic production, to move away from dependence on foreign
sources, and to price resources efficiently and reasonably in inter-
national markets.8 2 Thus, the role of the states in formulating and
carrying out a national energy policy should be subservient to na-
tional interests. The three severence tax cases as a whole do not
further that national energy policy picture. They could not be true
to that portrayal of an energy policy and be faithful to constitu-
tional law at the same time.
Commerce Clause18 3 analysis in this area is fairly straight-for-
ward. In order to avoid the commercial balkanization of the states,
the Constitution gives precedence to national commercial interests.
If a state's commercial policy or practice can be shown to interfere
with interstate commerce, the parochial state interest must give
way. States cannot discriminate in favor of their citizens over citi-
zens of other states.1
8 4
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,8 5 the Supreme
Court established a functional four part test to assess the constitu-
tionality of state taxes that affect interstate commerce. The Court
181. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
182. See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (Supp. IV 1980).
183. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. Supremacy Clause arguments are also made in these
cases. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
184. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruToNAL LAW 239-44, 344-
47 (1978).




[N]ot the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practi-
cal effect, and [sustains] a tax against Commerce Clause challenge
when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.8 "
Louisiana's "First Use Tax" violated this test while Montana's
severance tax and the severance tax imposed by the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe did not. In the Louisiana case the state imposed a
tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas on the
"first use" of any gas imported into Louisiana which was not previ-
ously taxed by any other state or the federal government. This was
equal to the state severance tax on Louisiana gas producers. The
purposes of the tax were: (1) to reimburse the people of Louisi-
ana for damages to the state's coastal areas and waters due to oil
and gas exploration in the Outer Continental Shelf; (2) to com-
pensate the state for costs incurred in protecting these resources;
and, (3) to equalize competition between gas produced in Louisi-
ana which was subject to the seven cents severance tax and gas
produced elsewhere and not subject to the severance tax. The ef-
fect of the tax was that Louisiana consumers were not burdened by
the tax, but out-of-state purchasers were. The Court held that the
"First Use Tax" unquestionably discriminated against interstate
commerce. As a matter of constitutional law the case is rightly de-
cided. The tax gave local interests a competitive advantage; thus, it
violated the anti-discrimination aspects of the Commerce
Clause.1 8 7 As a matter of energy policy the case also satisfies the
espoused need for a national market.
Montana's severance tax fared better. The tax is imposed on
each ton of coal mined within the state. There are various rates of
taxation depending on the value, energy content, and method of
extraction of the coal, and may equal at a maximum 30% of the
contract price of the coal. 188 Out-of-state purchasers argued that
Montana's severance tax discriminated against interstate com-
merce because 90% of the coal mined in Montana is shipped out of
186. Id. at 279.
187. See O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 O. L. REV.
395, 408-14 (1982).
188. 453 U.S. at 609.
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the state, and with the coal, so goes the tax burden. The Court
noted that unlike Maryland v. Louisiana, all coal producers in
Monatana were taxed similarly and the tax was held to be consti-
tutional. The Montana decision comports with constitutional law,
as does the Louisiana case, yet clearly, the two cases are unalike in
the effect each has on energy policy. The invalidation of the Loui-
siana tax fosters a national energy market by eliminating discrimi-
nation between local and out-of-state producers. Yet Montana's
tax structure burdens the national energy market by shifting the
tax bite out of the state and by discouraging the development of
Montana's coal resources. This effect is one of the profound para-
doxes of the anti-discrimination principle in Commerce Clause
analysis; the rule allows state taxation to affect interstate com-
merce as long as the locals are equally burdened. Louisiana could
also burden out-of-state gas producers as long as local gas produc-
ers were subjected to the same taxes.
The substantive rule, dealing with the limits of a state's ability
to tax, is applied consistently as a matter of law and has conflicting
consequences as a matter of policy. In part this is true because
policy options are, themselves, in conflict. Another reason is that
substantive law may not, and in these cases does not, comport with
a national energy policy. Part of the reasoning behind the Com-
merce Clause is to promote national markets. A conflicting reason
is more overtly political: i s9 the commerce clause also reserves and
promotes, at least partially, the sovereignty of the states.190
The political nature of these severance tax cases is expressed
in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.191 The tribe imposed a sever-
ance tax on any oil and natural gas severed or removed from tribal
lands situated in New Mexico. Long-term lessees challenged that
tax as contrary to the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court held
189. See, McGrath & Hellerstein, Reflections on Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 43 MoNT. L. REv. 165, 177 (1982) (the authors note the political nature of the decision
and its institutional ramification that courts will not scrutinize the state's rationale for its
tax: the tax will stand if it is "fairly related" to the legislative purpose). See also, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REv. 91, 102-112 (1981); O'Fallon, supra note 187
at 414-20.
190. A state's right to reserve the economic benefit for itself will not be given too
much weight as the Supreme Court held in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331 (1982). In this case New Hampshire restricted the exportation of hydroelectric
energy produced in the state. This electricity was produced by federally licensed producers
plugged into a power grid that connected six states. The Court said that this violated the
Commerce Clause.
191. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of tribal sover-
eignty and that the tax satisfied the Complete Auto Transit test.
In deciding the case the Court's primary and natural concern cen-
tered around the discussion of the unique status of indian tribes in
this country and of the need to protect their attributes of sover-
eignty. So viewed, the power to tax is an "essential instrument of
self-government and territorial management. ' 192 The Court also
sustained the tax in the face of challenges that the tax violated the
negative implications of the Commerce Clause because "it takes an
activity that is an integral part of the flow of commerce, discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, and imposes a multiple burden
on interstate commerce."193
There is a recurring theme throughout the sections of this ar-
ticle. It is as if two separate and distinct languages vie for our at-
tention.1 9 One is the language of economics. There is a need for
efficient and fair markets. In the severance tax cases that language
appears in the context of interstate commerce. As a matter of en-
ergy policy it is a question of a national energy market that is
united with a vision of domestic production and supply. The other
is the language of politics. In the severance tax cases that language
focuses on the concept of sovereignty, which speaks to the use, dis-
tribution and allocation of wealth. This "linguistic" conflict is pro-
nounced when we speak about issues of federalism and energy
policy.
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Energy Crisis
Any chosen energy policy must confront the political tension
which exists between the states and the federal government for the
simple reason that natural resources are located within the states
as well as federal boundaries. Federalism in this area is less a doc-
trine or abstract rule of law than it is a geophysical reality. Feder-
alism describes the allocation of power between the states and the
central government. 9" Since Gibbons v. Ogden 986 the expansive
192. Id. at 139.
193. Id. at 152-53. See also, Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalism: The Role of
the Supreme Court in Preserving a National Common Market for Energy Supplies, 53 U.
COLo. L. REv. 281 (1982).
194. Sagoff, supra notes 163, 166 and 180; refer to infra Part V.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. X; L. TRIE, supra note 185 at § 5-20. Jurisdiction over legal
disputes is also apportioned between federal and state governments. See, Springfield v. Mc-
Carren, 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982); Utah v. FERC, 691 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 22:661
LAW AND POLICY
growth of the federal government has been legitimized. Much of
this growth can be attributed to the reduction of competition be-
tween the states so that national commerce and national markets
can participate effectively in the world market. As technology
shrinks the size of the globe, and as economic and political inter-
ests become more interdependent, national participation in the
world community is more of a necessity. A curious domestic devel-
opment is that for the last decade or more, congressional and pres-
idential initiatives have argued that the federal government was
too big and that the states should share responsibility for govern-
ance.197 Although the movement toward greater global participa-
tion by nations is not necessarily contradictory to our domestic
talk about increasing the power of the states, it does illustrate the
ambiguity of policy.
Historically, energy and natural resources initiatives were rele-
gated to state control. 9 The first federal forays into this area were
limited to interstate sales of resources. 99 That situation changed
upon the passage of the National Energy Act 00 and the Energy
Security Act.21' Now the federal government has interjected itself
into areas previously governed by the states. The crisis in energy
was perceived as requiring a national response. Where federalist
principles have clashed with national energy legislation, the na-
tional legislation has prevailed.0 2 The tension between state and
national power is addressed in the Constitution, under the
196. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
197. There are numerous recent examples of federal abdication or concession of gov-
ernmental responsibility in favor of the states. See, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S.
902 (1977); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959
(1977); Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-42 (1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 .- 65
(1978). See also, Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sover-
eignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
198. The first legal regime used by states for the allocation and distribution of natural
resources were common law rules. As the competition for resources increased, states passed
legislation. See, e.g., W. RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURcES LAW 24-64; 345-364
(1979); F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTHn & J. GEAnuD, NATURAL REsOURCES (1965). H. Wn -
LIAMS, R. MAXWELL, C. MEYFns, On. AND GAs 212-322; 330-879 (4th ed. 1979).
199. See e.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1976); Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
200. Refer to note 46 supra.
201. Refer to note 49 supra.
202. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (sustaining the constitutional-
ity of Public Utilities Regulatory Powers Act); see also, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
HAtv. L. REv. 62, 186-96 (1982).
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Supremacy Clause. °3 Supremacy Clause litigation normally is an
inquiry about the authority by which a specific federal action is
undertaken. The Commerce Clause, of course, is broad enough to
justify a wide range of governmental activity. Next, the issue is
whether state and federal regulations can co-exist or whether fed-
eral regulation has supplanted and excluded state regulation. 20 4
Like any generally worded provision, the Supremacy Clause is
open to interpretation and the basic point in dispute is whether
certain powers should reside in the states- or in the federal
government.
The federal courts, generally, have been consistent in sus-
taining federal energy legislation against constitutional attacks.
Once the federal government demonstrates a national need for reg-
ulation of energy resources it is a short step to legitimizing federal
intervention. Congress need only show that the means of regula-
tion selected are reasonably related to the goal of regulating inter-
state commerce, 20 5 in which case state law is pre-empted. In Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association"' and
Hodel v. Indiana20 7 the Supreme Court sustained the validity of
the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act against va-
rious constitutional challenges, including arguments by the states
that the tenth amendment protected their right to regulate private
land use. 08 Other recent energy legislation which has withstood
challenge on constitutional grounds includes the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act,2 09 and the Natural Gas Policy Act of
203. U.S. CONST. art VI.
204. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
205. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
206. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
207. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
208. Although such Congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the states'
prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the states may consider impor-
tant, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.
The Surface Mining and Reclaimation Act shared powers in this area if the state chose
to do so. Nevertheless,"... Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohib-
iting any state regulation of surface coal mining. We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act
should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a
regulatory role." Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 290.
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (Supp. IV 1980). In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. DOE, 666
F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982), the court of appeals upheld the Fuel Use Act which was in-
tended to conserve oil and natural gas by prohibiting the use of these resources in certain
installations and by encouraging the use of coal. In Atlanta Gas, the plaintiffs argued that a
prohibition on the use of natural gas for lighting purposes was beyond federal control be-
cause of the inherently local nature of their business. Even conceding the local nature of this
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1978.210
Nuclear energy issues are the most controversial in the entire
range of energy regulation. 21 1 As fears concerning reactor inci-
industry, the fact that it affects interstate commerce (here the national concern with the
shortage of natural gas) means that it is no longer immune from the central government.
The court added:
More importantly, the relatively small gas savings resulting from the Fuel Use Act
must be considered as an integral part of a much broader federal regulatory pro-
gram aimed at shifting our nation's energy consumption toward fuels that are
more plentiful and accessible than natural gas.
Id. at 1367.
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (Supp. IV 1980) and in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42
and 43 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980). Since 1938 federal regulation of natural gas sales had been
limited to interstate sales. Intrastate sales were left to be regulated by the states. These dual
markets created price disparities and market dislocation. One purpose of the NGPA was to
unify these two markets. This attempt at unification was attacked by Texas, Oklahoma and
Louisiana as interfering with each state's control. Following Hodel both the court of appeals
and the district court, rejected these arguments and sustained the Act. The Public Utilities
Regulatory Powers Act (PURPA), a statute which interjected the federal government into
state utility ratemaking at the retail level, was also held to be constitutional by the Supreme
Court. Refer to note 202 supra. The preemption of state authority by this legislation sup-
ports a united national energy policy for the purpose of giving the country a stronger voice
in the political economy.
211. Litigation in the nuclear power area has been anything but quiescent. Often
courts are the only forum for public interest groups. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act
which limits liability of nuclear power plants for damages); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limits U.S. courts of
appeal's jurisdiction to review NRC activities); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, (1983) (state may place moratorium on
construction of nuclear plants for financial reasons); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983) (NEPA does not require NRC
to assess psychological injury for perception of risk in environmental impact statement);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983)
(NRC's generic rule directing licensing boards to assume waste can be stored on site up-
held). In the lower courts the cases include Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(NRC failure to entertain private suit requesting licensing review upheld); Union of Con-
cerned Scientists v. NRC, 711 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (NRC ordered to review rulemaking
which indefinitely suspended deadline for "environmental qualification" of safety equip-
ment); McKay v. United States, 703 P.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1983) (landowners entitled to sue
for damages caused by contamination); Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC, 679
F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1982) (petition to review NRC's refusal to revoke construction permit
denied); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983) (Illinois Spent Fuel Act preempted by federal statutes); Potomac
Alliance v. NRC, 682 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (NRC ordered to review decision authoriz-
ing company to increase on-site nuclear waste storage capacity); Township of Lower Al-
loways Creek v. Publi6 Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982) (review of NRC
order expanding on-site storage of waste denied); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC,
690 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (NRC's refusal to order hearing on Seabrook evacuation plan
upheld); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(County's suit as ratepayer against nuclear plant for cost overruns dismissed); County of
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dents,212 transportation, 213 waste management, 14 and siting21 5 in-
crease, many citizens are troubled by the role of the federal gov-
ernment. To remedy perceived inadequacies in federal regulation,
state legislatures have attempted to pass a variety of laws only to
have the bulk of this legislation declared invalid.21 6 A recent and
controversial exception is Pacific Legal Foundation v. State En-
Rockland v. NRC, 709 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1983) (NRC order deciding against taking enforce-
ment against utility for deficiencies in offsite emergency preparedness upheld); Pennsylva-
nia v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983) (private damages actions as a
result of Three Mile Island denied); City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir.
1983) (NRC order allowing on-site storage of contaminated waste upheld).
212. See generally Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three
Mile Island (October 1979) (Kemeny Commission Report).
213. See e.g., Comment, Transportation of Nuclear Material: The Public Challenge,
11 RuT-CAm. L.J. 63 (1979); Trosten & Ancarrow, Federal-State-Local Relationships in
Transporting Radioactive Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road, 68 Ky. L.J. 251 (1979-80).
214. See Ausness, High-Level Radioactive Waste Management: The Nuclear Di-
lemma, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 707; Bromberg, Nuclear Power Wastes: Tomorrow's Problem
Faces Us Today, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 99 (1979); Jaksetic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive High-
Level Waste Management, 9 ENvTL. L. 347 (1979); Lash, A Comment on Nuclear Waste
Disposal, 4 J. CoNTEmp. L. 267 (1978); Linker, Beers & Lash, Radioactive Waste Gaps in the
Regulatory System, 56 DEN. L.J. 1 (1979); eiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposal: The
Emerging Issue of State's Rights, 13 AKRON L. REV. 261 (1979); Shea, New Nuclear Policy
Under the National Energy Plan, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 689 (1977); Comment, Disposal of
High-Level Nuclear Waste: An Abdication of Responsibility? 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 915; Com-
ment, Nuclear Waste Disposal: A Federal and State Problem, 65 Ky. L.J. 917 (1977); Note,
Radioactive Waste: A Failure in Governmental Regulation, 37 ALB. L. REv. 97 (1972); Sym-
posium on Nuclear Waste Management, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 693 (1980); see also, Illinois
v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982); Potomac Alliance v. NRC, 682 F.2d 1030
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687
F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982) These three cases are discussed infra at note 239 and accompanying
text.
215. See New England Coalition v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978); Public Serv. Co.
v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Application of Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 277 Or. 447, 561
P.2d 154 (1977); PIRG v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 152 N.J. Super 191, 377 A.2d
915, cert. denied, 754 N.J. 538, 384 A.2d 517 (1977); Cronin & Turner, Article VIII of the
Public Service Law-The Brave New World of Power Plant Siting in New York: A Critique
and Suggestion for an Alternative Approach, 42 ALB. L. REV. 537 (1978); Comment, Califor-
nia's Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation: A Preemption Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189 (1979).
216. See, e.g., Meek, Nuclear Power and State Radiation Protection Measures: The
Impotence of Preemption, 10 ENvTL L. 1 (1979); Nuclear Power and Preemption: Opportu-
nities for State Regulation, 27 CLV. ST. L. REv. 117 (1978); Federalism and Energy, 18
ARiz. L. REV. 283 (1976); Note, Pre-emption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Per-
missible State Regulation of Nuclear Facilities' Location, Transportation of Radioactive
Materials and Radioactive Waste Disposal, 11 TuLsA L.J. 397 (1976); Annot., 82 A.L.R3d
751 (1978); Note, Redefining the Role of the States in the Nuclear Licensing Process: The
Nuclear Siting and Licensing Act of 1978, 58 B.U.L. REV. 649 (1978). Preemption of local
regulations is discussed in United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
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ergy Resources Conservation & Development Commission.217 The
Supreme Court held that a California statute, that imposed a mor-
atorium on the construction of new nuclear plants until a state
agency found a satisfactory method of waste disposal, was not pre-
empted because the law was motivated by fiscal rather than safety
concerns. 218 Pacific Legal Foundation cuts against the formation of
a national nuclear policy by allowing states to prevent the con-
struction of nuclear plants. At the same time, the case honors the
goals of the Supremacy Clause by reconciling the allocations of
power in a federal system.
Like the severence tax cases. cases which deal with issues of
federalism (Tenth Amendment, Supremacy Clause and pre-emp-
tion) are consistent with substantive rules of law. Yet even though
the legal concept of federalism allows concurrent federal and state
involvement in policymaking, a tension between centralized and
decentralized decisionmaking remains.2 19 While centralization pro-
motes a national policy, decentralization fosters fragmentation.
Substantive legal rules and principles, in general, fragment energy
policy because the law attempts to reconcile the competing claims
and values of politics and economics.
VI. VALUES
The preceding sections on structures, methods, and substan-
tive rules demonstrate how comprehensive policy formation breaks
down under the weight of institutionalized and embedded conflicts
in the decisionmaking system. Further analysis suggests a more
profound and thematic conflict: a conflict in values. This conflict
pits economics against politics. This is not the only "values" con-
217. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
218. The case is controversial because most judicial opinions and scholarly works indi-
cate that federal regulation in this field is pervasive if not exclusive. Refer to note 60 supra.
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (private
cause of action by county for construction cost overruns pre-empted); United Nuclear Corp.
v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220 (D.R.L 1982) (state statute which required bond for nuclear
waste disposal pre-empted); but see, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S.,
Jan. 11, 1984) (federal preemption does not extend to preclude award of punitive damages
against the state whose employee was contaminated by plutonium).
219. See, e.g., Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field of Energy Resource
Development: Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 Aiuz. L. REv. 785 (1981); Watson,
Measuring and Mitigating Socio-Economic Environmental Impacts of Constructing En-
ergy Projects: An Emerging Regulatory Issue, 10 NAT. REsOURCEs L. 393 (1977); Dept. of
Justice Memorandum, Constitutionality of the Energy Mobilization Board Proposal, 125
Cong. Rec. S.13884-87 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1979).
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flict that exists,220 but it is pervasive. Economics and politics are
broad enough both to address a wide range of issues and to serve
as the bases of predictive theory building.22' Both economic and
political norms operate in the decisionmaking system and both
should be honored. Proponants of one theory understandably
downplay the significance of the other. To the extent that there
exists a tendency to favor economic principles today, political val-
ues have become obfuscated or lost. A balance between the two is
required for the formulation of stronger policies. Striking a better
balance may require nothing more, nor less, radical than an ex-
plicit recognition of the political significance of policy decisions
and an explicit articulation of the accomodations that must be
made between economics and politics.222
Economics and politics are like two cultures, each with a lan-
guage of its own.223 The language of economics is imbued with "ef-
ficiency, '' 224 or wealth maximization,225 and bespeaks an allegiance
220. See, e.g., J. ToMAIN & S. HOLLIs, ENERGY DECISION MAKING: THE INTERACTION OF
LAW AND POLICY ch. 9 (1983) (discussing some similarities and differences between the scien-
tific method and the legal method and suggesting that this poses a major values conflict).
221. There are three current theories of government regulation. Some writers apply
their particular theory to internal administrative law; that is, the theory is used to explain
how bureaucracies function. Others apply the theory more broadly to why governments reg-
ulate. Proponents of the usefulness or organizational theory include: J. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE (1983); Mashaw, Mirrored Ambivalence: A Sometimes Curmudgeonly
Comment on the Relationship Between Organization Theory and Administrative Law, 33
J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1983); Schuck, Organization Theory and the Teaching of Administra-
tive Law, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1983). Political theorists include C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND
MARKETs (1977); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); and J. WILSON, THE POLIT-
ICS OF REGULATIONS (1980). Finally, the economists are best exemplified by STIGLER, supra
note 32 and Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScL. 335
(1974). These are not discrete theories, see, e.g., LrrwAN & NORDHAUS supra note 6 at 34-44
and 95-99. The economic theory is only slightly distinguishable from the political theory.
Regulatory benefits go where demand is greatest according to the economic view or where
power is greatest according to the political view. It may be that the supply/demand motif
both describes economic regulation and has predictive power to ascertain where the benefits
of economic regulation will go in the future. This theory less successfully describes or
predicts where the benefits of social regulation go. It is argued here that energy policy is
complex enough to be characterized as both economic and social regulation and that both
theories have application.
222. See J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY chs. 3, 6 (1983); LINDBLOM, supra note 28 passim; R. REICH, THE NEXT
AMERICAN FRONTIERS 3-21, 255-82 (1983).
223. See LINDBLOM, supra note 27.
224. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 1977); Korn-
hauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591
(1980); Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 659 (1980).
225. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-115 (1981); Coleman, Effi-
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to utilitarianism.22 Although not without its critics, particularly
when economic sciences are drafted to do legal analysis,22 the ap-
peal of economics is a powerful one.s22 The economics culture em-
phasizes profitability, productivity, and economic growth through
reliance on the free market, private participation for private gain,
and when helpful, a less intrusive government. Quantified analysis
and results are attractive because they make complicated issues
simple. Quantified data produces something that staff members
can show to supervisors and something on which decisionmakers
can rely when decisions must be made public. Economically-based
methodologies also produce results which can be evaluated in the
short term. By contrast, the vocabulary of politics is more amor-
phous, open-ended, idealistic and qualitative. Politics is concerned
with power and where power resides in the state. In a democracy
power is diffused, so the political language of democracy concerns
itself with such issues as individual autonomy, 229 community-re-
garding goals,2 0 equality,23 1 due process232 and interest representa-
tion.233 The government may be expected to correct market defects
and to promote social policies that may be economically inefficient,
but inefficiency is a result the free market will not accept. If eco-
ciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 509 (1980).
226. See, ETmICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW chs. 5-10 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1982);
but see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 48-87 (1981).
227. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG ch. 4 (1978); Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. Rv. 451 (1974); Markovits, Legal Anal-
ysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 811 (1980);
Michelman, supra note 180; Schwartz, supra note 180; see also, CALABREsi & BOBBrrT, supra
note 3 at 15-28 and 81-127 (discussing why economic markets can fail to make fair
decisions).
228. Aside from the prodigious work of Judge Richard Posner, the literature of law
and economics is vast. Emory University School of Law holds an annual seminar for law
teachers to learn to do economic analysis under the direction of Professor Henry Manne.
See also THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975); B. ACKERMAN & W.
HASSLER, CLEAN/DIRTY Am (1981). Economic materials now constitute regular fare in the
most recent case books. Economic analysis of law now constitutes "normal science" to use
Thomas Kuhn's phrase. Some basic works include: R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2d ed. 1977); R. PosNn. TH ECONoMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Efficiency as a Legal Concern,
8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv.
811 (1980); The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983). A
thorough bibliography is contained in C. Gorzz, LAw AND ECONOMICS 505-44 (1984).
229. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-14 (1981); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. RaV. 1685, 1713-24 (1976).
230. See B. AcKERa m, SocL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 374-78 (1980).
231. Refer to note 17 supra.
232. See, e.g., Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
233. Refer to Stewart, supra note 5, J. ELY, supra note 119.
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nomic analysis can be catagorized as a search for efficient out-
comes, political analysis is a search for fair or equitable out-
comes.23 4 Similarly, while the culture of economics relies on short-
term results, the culture of politics depends on long-term commit-
ment. Naturally, these are not discrete areas of analysis. Things
economic are often political and vice versa. The government is not
the savior of the social needs of the underclass to such an extent
that it is totally unresponsive to economic pressures. Nevertheless,
the languages and methods that are used to analyze issues and
reach results often pit economics against politics in such a way as
to have them compete for the attention of decisionmakers.3 5 A
government decisionmaker, political by nature, is often confronted
with extremely complex issues. This, coupled with a bias in favor
of hard data, creates a decisionmaking schizophrenia which is em-
bedded throughout the system.
Although the structures of decisionmaking can be described as
more politically than economically motivated, the methods the
decisionmakers use are clearly biased in favor of economics; hence,
the schizophrenia.2 36 The hallmark of the structural conflicts,
which were described above, was the struggle for political power.
The most visible characteristic of the economic methodologies
waws economic efficiency. The substantive rules recognize and ac-
cept both sets of values. Indeed, the vitality of a substantive rule
lies in its ability to reconcile political and economic claims in areas
of public law decisionmaking. Even though the methodologies tend
toward an economic calculus, political choices affect their applica-
tion. Similarly, even though the structural conflicts are fundamen-
tally political, often the more efficient structure will prevail. These
cross-overs between economics and politics are not signs of confu-
sion and indeterminacy. They signify the existence of a relation
between the two sets of values. This is the "relation among the
signs. ' '237 It is this reciprocal relationship between economic and
political values that prevents policy from becoming chaotic.
234. Refer to Michelnan, supra note 180, Schwartz, supra note 180, Sagoff, supra
notes 163, 166, and 180.
235. Refer to Sagoff, supra note 163; Sagoff, On Markets for Risk, 41 MD. L. REv. 755,
761-69 (1982).
236. It is important that these two ideas do not collapse into one another. Proponents
of economic analysis, in their more grandiose moments, would argue that the efficient or
wealth maximization decision is the fair one. This is a claim that cannot be supported. See,
e.g., Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSTA L. REv. 641 (1980).
237. Id.
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Energy law and policy interact in a way which accepts, if not
encourages, the interplay between economics and politics. A read-
ing of energy legislation and cases makes clear that economics
plays a significant, but not exclusive, role in policymaking. Never-
theless, the politics of energy is also a potent force.23 8 It would be
wrong, then, to characterize energy law and policy as either social
or economic regulation. 39 An area as complex as this is both.24 e
238. See, e.g., supra notes 18 and 22; Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation
and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63 (1982).
239. Earlier, in Part IV A, the point was made that the Commerce Clause is motivated
by political as well as economic considerations. How one characterizes a legal issue is out-
come determinative. If a decisionmaker prefers one set of values over another, then an out-
come can be determined. In Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) Judge
Posner, writing for the court, struck down an Illinois statute that barred nuclear wastes
generated out of state from being stored in Illinois with this language, at 213-14:
The efficient disposal of wastes is as much a part of economic activity as the pro-
duction that yields the wastes as a byproduct, and to impede the interstate move-
ment of those wastes is as inconsistent with the efficient allocation of resources as
to impede the interstate movement of the product that yields them... Nuclear
wastes have to be stored somewhere, and the place of storage should be chosen
without regard to the parochial interests of the states.
While this Commerce Clause analysis speaks to the interest of a national market, it over-
shadows the "sovereignty" interest of the type that was upheld in Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). One consequence of such embeddedness is that the na-
ture of the decision being made is often misperceived because the issues are couched in
rhetoric.
Each mode of speaking about energy policy can define the debate. Because the two
often conflict, the way we talk about a particular issue, and the way we characterize a prob-
lem can prefigure the outcome. An argument which favors efficiency can overcome political
claims and bias the outcome.
The choice between expanding the on-site storage facilities for nuclear waste and deny-
ing a permit turns as much on how the issue is presented to the court as it does on the law.
If the proponents of expansion argue that expansion is efficient and economical, and the
argument is carried on in essentially economic terms, e.g., positive cost benefit analysis or
favorable cost of service implications, then the outcome is literally predetermined: the ex-
pansion will be granted.
Similarly, if the opponents succeed in characterizing the issue as one which involves
complex and uncertain scientific problems, and issues of democratic representation and par-
ticipation in decisionmaking about the fate of future nuclear generations, then, clearly, the
opposite outcome is likely.
Compare Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d
732 (3d Cir. 1982) with Potomac Alliance v. NRC, 682 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court
in Lower Alloways took pains to note how the petitioners failed to meet their burden of
proof in arguing that the expansion permit would significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the burden on the Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement issue lies with the NRC. See also Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d
412 (D.C. Cir. 1979). These cases can be reconciled, but they emphasize the major point that
courts are influenced by different rhetoric. In Lower Alloways a power plant shutdown was
not seen as an attractive alternative, and the court used the burden of proof to prevent that
result. The Potomac Alliance case was more of an inter-branch jurisdictional fight. See, e.g.,
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW





Neither law nor policy is exclusively positive or normative, eco-
nomic or political. Both cultures pervade the ultimate rules, regu-
lations, final orders and decisions which wind their way through
the decisionmaking corridors. The fragmentation and splintering of
a comprehensive substantive policy is a consequence of this matrix.
Yet, the matrix does demonstrate an interdependence between the
system and the norms.
Decisionmaking structures are aligned more closely with polit-
ics than economics because the structures are founded on the es-
sentially politically-oriented positive laws of the Constitution and
enabling legislation. These laws are the major influences on the al-
location of decisionmaking power, and they represent compromises
of power and policy between and within branches of the federal
government and between federal and state governments. Some, if
not many, of the laws concentrate on things economic, and most
are at least influenced by economic thought and variables. Never-
theless, the deeper principles are political as power is divided and
shared among various groups and interests.
The methodologies are more closely aligned with economics
682 F.2d at 1035:
Whether the benefits of expanding the North Anna spent-fuel pool outweigh the
costs is a question we are ill-equipped and unauthorized to answer. Our limited
objective, therefore, is to determine what procedures NEPA requires and whether
the NRC has followed them. (Bazelon, J., concurring.)
240. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7112 (Supp. I 1972), which is the statement of purpose for
the Department of Energy. Among the purposes are to centralize, § 7112(1)-(3) and decen-
tralize decisionmaking § 7112(11); to protect consumers § 7112(a) and foster competition §
7112(12); to promote energy development § 7112(5)(c) and protect the environment § 7112
(13); and, foster private sector involvement § 7112(14) and public participation § 7112(15).
These are some of the goals that easily conflict and which indicate a concern both for eco-








because of the need, addressed earlier, for tools to make decisions
in light of a mass of difficult and oftentimes conflicting data. The
methods can yield hard information with which decisions can be
made. An economic theory of policymaking has several attractive
features. First, the economic view lends itself to decisionmaking
because of its required quantification. Second, decisions based on
economic criteria are valuable because they are short term,241
which means that specific decisions can be made as needed. Third,
these two elements combine to give the appearance of reduced un-
certainty.24 2 Economics, therefore, simplifies complex decisions.
The primary problem with the economic approach is that it is too
segmented. It operates in the short term and fails to take a macro-
scopic view of the policymaking process.
24 '
The tension between economics and politics has been recog-
nized in discussions of internal administrative law where the lack
of cohesive policies is frequently noted.244 Not so curiously, the ele-
ments that operate to make internal administrative law difficult to
reconcile 245 recur throughout the system. Conflicts between effi-
ciency and fairness, and between economics and politics, can be
reconciled by explicating the political nature of many of these de-
cisions and then accommodating the political variables.246 Equity
issues must also be determined alongside efficiency issues. Instead
of an economic Darwinism where policy is supplied to whichever
interest group makes the strongest demand,2 47 decisionmaking
should also foster participation, collaboration, and collective
adaptation. 48
241. See COHEN & ROGERS, supra note 222 at 51-62. These authors argue that one of
the deep constraints in a "capitalist democracy" is that society is structured to satisfy short-
term material demands. Indeed, central to an economic analysis is the concept that deci-
sions must be made currently. Short-term decisions are visible, and planning is facilitated.
After all, as Lord Keynes said, in the long-term we are all dead anyway.
242. Refer to R. POsNER, supra note 225.
243. R. LrrWAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 6 at 90-91 write: "Efficiency requires at
each point that the overall benefits from the effort be compared with the costs, regulation
should occur therefore, only when the total benefits outweigh the total costs." At what point
in time? Start up costs of a regulatory program will surely outweigh initial benefits. Are we
now talking about marginal costs once a program is operating? If so, how long should the
program operate? Moreover, there are values that are not quantifiable and values that will
tolerate inefficiencies. Refer to note 169 supra.
244. Refer to note 7, supra.
245. See, e.g., L MASHAW, supra note 6 at 103-04.
246. R. REICH, supra note 222; J. COHEN & I. ROGERS, supra note 222.
247. Refer to G. STIGLER, supra note 32; R. PosNER, supra note 226.
248. R. REICH, supra note 222; J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, supra note 222.
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That politics and economics both influence our society is ines-
capable. The fact that political decisions often concern or affect
economic regulation is likewise true. The law, then, and the insti-
tutions that it legitimizes is a reflection of these larger phenomena.
Policy disarry occurs as a result of the interaction of structures,
methods, and rules of law, and because of the overwhelming nature
of the problems. It can be seen, then, that the tension between
economics and politics, which is most acute when a decisionmaker
is faced with choosing between an efficient but unfair decision or a
fair but inefficient one, is embedded not only in the structures of
the law but also in methodologies and substantive rules. It is futile
to expect a full and detailed substantive policy to wind its way
unscathed through this decisionmaking system. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic and political values provide a direction for policymaking. In
this very important respect economics and politics are linked to-
gether in a common purpose. The stronger the link the more co-
herent the policy. Economic productivity and social justice are de-
pendent norms.""
VII. CONCLUSION
Before a comprehensive substantive policy is formed it must
work its way through a complex of structures that are influenced
by normative political considerations, methodologies that are al-
igned with positive economic criteria, and a set of substantive rules
that reflect an ambivalence between politics and economics. Char-
acteristic of the interaction between law and policy, and at the
center of the failure of energy policy to coalesce, is a purported
conflict in values. The tension is one that is played out between
the norms of politics and economics. The reciprocal relationship
between politics and economics shapes policymaking. Deci-
sionmakers should be sensitive to the interplay between the two
sets of values, and they should articulate the bases of their deci-
sions in a way that embraces both the economic vision and the po-
litical vision of policy choices.
It is proposed here that the legal system plays a significant
part in policymaking. Undoubtedly there are numerous influences
exogeneous to the legal system that also operate in policy forma-
249. R. REICH, supra note 222 at 21: "The central theme of this book is that in the
emerging era of productivity, social justice is not incompatible with economic growth, but
essential to it."
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tion. Social psychology, shifts in ideology, and cultural norms al-
tered by economic realities, each affect the policies that are ulti-
mately given life. They also affect a legal system which is not a
sterile embodiment of some abstract and disassociated sense of jus-
tice; the legal system incorporates the values that exist in society.
The greater the incorporation of these values the more legitimate
the system.

